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Donald R. Morrison

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AN ANALYSIS OF THE DIMENSIONS OF
CONGRESSIONAL VOTING
THE CASE OF FOREIGN AID

by
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Bachelor of Arts, Eckerd College, 1973

A thesis
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty
of the
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for the degree of Master of Arts

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1984

This Thesis submitted by Donald R. Morrison in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts from the University of North Dakota is hereby approved by the Faculty Advisory Committee under whom the work has been done.

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This Thesis meets the standards for appearance and conforms to the style and format requirements of the Graduate School of the University of North Dakota, and is hereby approved.

A. William Johnson 5/2/84
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Degree Master of Arts

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Signature Donald R. Morrison

Date April 18, 1984

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES	v
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	vi
ABSTRACT	vii
CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER II. RESEARCH DESIGN	26
CHAPTER III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION	44
CHAPTER IV. CONCLUSION	78
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY	84

LIST OF TABLES

1.	Loadings for the Rotated Factor Matrices	33
2.	Proportion of Variance Explained by Each Factor	38
3.	Synopses of Funding Dimension Indexes	45
4.	Synopses of Policy Dimension Issues	49
5.	Comparison of R^2 from Three Equations	58
6.	Bivariate Betas on Funding Dimensions	61
7.	Partial Betas on Funding Dimensions	62
8.	Results of Non-Selective Regressions on the 96th Senate Funding Dimension	66
9.	Bivariate Betas on Policy Question Dimensions	68
10.	Partial Betas on Policy Question Dimensions	69
11.	Percentage of Party Support for Prodevelopment, Moderate, and Traditional Positions: 95th and 96th Senate General Dimensions	73
12.	Regional Deviations from the Grand Mean for Policy Dimensions	75

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ABSTRACT

The major focus of this paper concerns defining congressional issue dimensions towards the American foreign assistance programs of 1979 to 1982. The resulting dimensions serve as a foundation to identify coalitions of congressmen who support or oppose different aspects of foreign aid policies. Previous foreign aid vote studies have usually divided congressmen into pro and con camps or placed them along activist-restrained continuums. This study, however, is based on the assumption that foreign aid policy has become too complex for such divisions and that its dimensions center more around the types of aid, the purposes of aid, and the ideological leanings of the intended recipients.

Roll-call votes were initially sorted into dimensions by a factor analysis procedure. These results were used to construct issue dimension indexes for both houses of Congress for the 95th and 96th Congresses. For each data set the results produced two groups of indexes, one concerning funding questions and the others concerning policy questions. The funding dimensions were assumed to encompass the compromises that were necessary in order to produce passable legislation. These dimensions were considered important because they could be used to identify congressmen who support or oppose foreign aid on a general level. The policy question dimensions, on the other hand, were assumed to show two simplified positions towards foreign aid issues. At one end of the policy dimension are those mostly concerned with fostering private enterprise and using force to protect the status quo and American interests. Called traditionalists, these members consider foreign aid to be useful if it enables the United States

to make a strong response to the spread of communism. The opposite side was labeled the prodevelopment position and consisted of those who view the capitalism-versus-communism-socialism world view as oversimplistic. They are more likely to favor international cooperation in solving the Third World problems that make countries susceptible to communism. The major basis for congressional decision-making appears to be the ideological inclinations of recipient governments. The traditional group directs aid to right-wing governments and the prodevelopment group aims aid at moderate and left-leaning nations.

The coalitions which supported the traditional and prodevelopment positions were identified by regression equations which included ideology, party, region, median income, and urban-rural variables. The major finding was that liberals were always more likely prodevelopment and conservatives more likely traditional. The importance of ideology tends to add credence to the theory that congressmen view foreign and domestic issues from the same set of beliefs. Although party was a significant factor only half the time its importance was found to be related to the pull of presidential loyalty considerations. Regional, urban-rural and constituency income factors were found to be of little or no importance in identifying coalitions.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The aim of congressional research is to increase our understanding of the congressional decision-making process. In this task students of Congress, no less than congressmen themselves, are faced with the arduous job of making conclusions from an enormous amount of complex and subjective information. The congressional decision-making process includes a great deal of bargaining, conflict resolution and blurring of objectives. This is especially true concerning the issue of foreign aid legislation. The results are often "a fragmented 'grab-bag' of initiatives that are often contradictory in content and intended result."¹ Remarking on the haphazard way foreign aid has been handled, Congressman Clarence Long, a member of the House Foreign Operations Subcommittee, said:

It seems to me that our foreign aid program is like a fire company going to a raging fire with a hose whose water leaks out of the sides and the joints, and never comes out of the front, and if the fire goes out, it won't be because of a fire company or anything.

The purpose of the present study is to attempt to find order in the apparent confusion. A major effort will be aimed at defining the

¹Elliott R. Morss and Victoria A. Morss, U.S. Foreign Aid: An Assessment of New and Traditional Development Strategies (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982), p. 79.

²U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance and Other Related Agencies: Appropriations for 1976 (Part 3), Hearings before a subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations. 94th Cong., 1st. Sess., 1975, p. 356.

issue dimensions of congressional thinking on foreign aid questions from 1979 to 1982. The resulting issue areas will subsequently serve as the basis for identifying coalitions of support and opposition to the various aspects of the American foreign aid policies. It is hoped that this will more accurately reflect the present decision-making cleavages within Congress than would a simple for and against foreign aid analysis.

The importance of the foreign assistance issue lies in the fact that every president since Franklin D. Roosevelt has asked for and received such legislation as an integral part of his foreign policy. It has often been controversial. The divisions of opinion have repeatedly revolved around American values and the role which the country wishes to play in world affairs. Most recently, President Ronald Reagan, long a foe of foreign aid, has proposed initiatives for Central America that include relatively large amounts of military and economic assistance. How Congress deals with foreign aid has long term consequences for how America continues in its role as a world leader.

Aid to other countries is also an important issue area for study because it differs in several respects from most other policy areas. For example, it has no powerful domestic constituency outside the government directly benefiting from its programs.³ Politicians are seldom able to win political points with the voters by advocating foreign aid pro-

³Michael Kent O'Leary, The Politics of American Foreign Aid (New York: Atherton Press, 1967), pp. 57-59. For a discussion of the more recent development of foreign government lobbies see Thomas M. Franck and Edward Weisband, Foreign Policy by Congress (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 171-6.

grams.⁴ How congressmen view an issue removed from most Americans' interest and one that is mostly lobbied for by administration officials may shed some light on how strong party, constituency, and personal characteristics remain as determinants of policy positions. Within this context, this study may add to the information about direct and indirect influences on the decision-making process.

Theoretical Basis

Regardless of the issue area chosen for study, a congressional researcher first needs to analyze how congressmen make decisions. Most studies answer this by proposing theories based upon methods congressmen use to simplify information to a level where decisions can be made.⁵ For example, Matthews and Stimson have supported the cue-taking theory which maintains that when a member must vote on an issue about which he knows very little, he follows trusted colleagues who have more specific information for an independent decision.⁶ David B. Truman has analyzed how a legislator's multiple and overlapping group affiliations condition legislative decision-making.⁷ Many studies have concentrated on how decisions are influenced by the coalitions or

⁴See John W. Kingdon, Congressmen's Voting Decisions, (New York: Harper & Row, 1973), p. 144; and William L. Morrow, "Legislative Control of Administrative Discretion: The Case of Congress and Foreign Aid," The Journal of Politics 30 (November 1968):985-6.

⁵See Aaron Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process, 3d ed. (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1979).

⁶Donald R. Matthews and James A. Stimson, Yeas and Nays: Normal Decision-Making in the U.S. House of Representatives (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1975), p. 45.

⁷David B. Truman, The Governmental Process (New York: Knopf, 1951), cited by Ralph K. Huitt and Robert L. Peabody, Congress: Two Decades of Analysis (New York: Harper & Row, 1969).

blocs which members enter into in order to maximize their strength.⁸

John W. Kingdon constructed a model of the decision-making process in which the fundamental decision rule was a consensus mode. Under this theory a legislator votes according to what would produce the least amount of conflict among all the significant political forces, including his own position, as they relate to the matter.⁹

One underlying theme in all the above theories appears to be policy content. The member of Congress undoubtedly shares opinions with the trusted colleagues from whom he takes cues. The groups, blocs and coalitions to which a senator or representative belongs are partly determined by the beliefs each holds in common. As well, voting within a consensus is conditional on how the majority of political forces view a certain subject. It is with such reasoning that Clausen, MacRae and others have supported the issue dimension theory of decision-making.¹⁰ These theorists regard other theories as providing valuable insights concerning the decision-rules used by legislators. However, as Clausen succinctly states, the assumption of the policy dimension theory is that "with rare exception, the decision-rule is chosen after the policy content has been determined."¹¹

The present study is based upon the issue dimension theory. Basically, this approach asserts that in order to manage the time and energy demands of decision-making, legislators view specific policy pro-

⁸Aage R. Clausen, How Congressmen Decide: A Policy Focus (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1973), p. 32.

⁹Kingdon, pp. 230-41.

¹⁰Clausen; and Duncan MacRae, Jr., Dimensions of Congressional Voting (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958).

¹¹Clausen, p. 13.

posals within the confines of a limited number of policy content categories. Decisions on specific proposals can be made according to the policy positions the member has chosen for each policy category.¹²

In two important respects the present study differs from previous issue dimension studies. First, while Clausen and MacRae intended the dimension theory to be used as a general categorization of issues, this study has chosen one specific issue area for analysis. This is an effort to see how specific the issue dimensions may actually be. Second, a more or less all-encompassing ideology variable will be employed to check the assumption that congressmen do not use such a general decision-rule.

Support for examining congressional decisions concerning foreign aid within the context of issue dimensions can be found in a study by Rudolph R. Rousseau which concluded that one of four "most significant factors in the Senate's decisions flowed from the substantive and political contents of the legislation itself."¹³ This factor coupled with the personal attitudes of the senator were found to be increasing in importance. Rousseau reasoned that the rising relevance of issues and opinions was due to the declining significance of executive branch leadership and the decreasing impact of the authorizing committee members' judgments.¹⁴

In order to construct variables to represent congressional issue dimensions political scientists can use roll-call votes as indicators of

¹²Ibid., p. 14.

¹³Rudolph R. Rousseau, "Factors Affecting Decisions of the United States Senate on Bilateral and Multilateral Foreign Assistance Legislation, 1965 to 1974" (Ph.D. dissertation, Tufts University, 1976), p. 505.

¹⁴Ibid., pp. 499-505.

congressional opinion. Empirical methods are then used to categorize votes according to similar voting patterns.¹⁵ In turn, these new classifications can be used as dependent variables in order to determine how a host of independent variables affect policy positions.

Historical Context of Foreign Aid

An understanding of the issues involved in American foreign aid requires a basic knowledge of how they fit into the context of the country's foreign policy.¹⁶ From a historical perspective the concept of foreign aid grew out of Cold War concerns about containing communism. The Marshall Plan was seen as an investment of funds to rebuild war-torn Europe in order to create economic stability and ensure national defense. This program was temporary and successful. Europe and Japan did recover. During this same period, communism and the Soviet threat appeared to require the arming of friendly countries. For this task the Mutual Security Agency was created to oversee the military aspects of foreign assistance.

Beginning in the 1950s the focus of foreign assistance gradually turned towards the underdeveloped world. The amount of economic aid grew in relation to military aid.¹⁷ In 1973 during the height of detente,

¹⁵See Duncan MacRae, Jr., Issues and Parties in Legislative Voting: Methods of Statistical Analysis (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), p. 13.

¹⁶For more in depth background see Franck and Weisband; Lloyd D. Black, The Strategy of Foreign Aid (Princeton, NJ: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1968); and Robert S. Walters, American and Soviet Aid: A Comparative Analysis (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1970).

¹⁷For additional review of economic versus military aid see Franck and Weisband; Andrew F. Westwood, Foreign Aid in a Foreign Policy Framework (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1966); and David Wall, The Charity of Nations: The Political Economy of Foreign Aid (New York: Basic Books, 1973).

Congress approved guidelines for a "New Directions" approach to aid.¹⁸ This mandated that "a substantial amount" of development aid was to be channeled to the poorest segments of Third World countries.¹⁹ It clothed foreign aid with a recognition that past policies had failed because support for strategic right-wing oligarchies had left the majorities in underdeveloped countries further and further behind in achieving economic, social and political power. The poor of the developing world do not have the resources to contribute much to the economies of their countries. By contributing little they get little in return and the vicious cycle-of-poverty continues. It was hoped that by focusing development efforts at the rural poor more of the world's population would gain the ability to help themselves.

Although there are numerous approaches to implementing development assistance, they need not be discussed here.²⁰ This type of aid is basically considered to be an additional ingredient in an evolutionary development process. Aid is usually in the form of grants, loans, or anti-poverty programs. The focus of aid projects include agrarian re-

¹⁸For discussions on the "New Directions" approach to aid see Steven H. Arnold, ed., Readings in International Development, 1982 ed. (Lexington, Mass.: Ginn Custom Publishing, 1982), pp. 88-144; Morss and Morss, pp. 24-31; and Frances Moore Lappe', Joseph Collins, and David Kinley, Aid As Obstacle: Twenty Questions about Our Foreign Aid and the Hungry (San Francisco: Institute for Food and Development Policy, 1981) pp. 54-70.

¹⁹Congressional Quarterly Inc., Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1982 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1982), p. 162 (hereafter cited as CQA).

²⁰See Morss and Morss, pp. 31-57; James P. Grant, Growth from Below: A People-Oriented Development Strategy, Development Paper, no. 16 (Washington, D.C.: Overseas Development Council, 1973); and Judith Tendler, Inside Foreign Aid (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), pp. 85-110.

form, health care, training and technical assistance, education, and control of population growth. The general objectives of both military and economic aid are to help countries develop sufficient strength to resist external aggression and internal subversion. Usually, military aid has included grants, loans, and easy credit terms to buy American-made weapons systems; training of military and security forces; and programs of the Economic Support Fund (ESF). Generally, the ESF is a program designed to help strategic nations ease the economic burden of their defense budgets.

The push for a more development oriented foreign aid policy reached a peak under President Jimmy Carter's human rights foreign policy. However, under President Reagan foreign aid programs have been changed so that they will complement major reversals in foreign policy. Strong anti-communist, national security stands have led to significant increases in military aid spending. The administration's fervent belief in the capitalistic system has redirected the focus of economic aid away from anti-poverty programs and towards attempts to promote development along capitalistic lines.

As opposed to the earlier Marshall Plan, the goals of aid have become more complex, more vague, more difficult to implement, and thus more open to criticism. Whether or not the economic aid programs or the military aid programs have been successful is an open question. Opponents of military aid believe it is too often used by recipient governments to retard the economic changes development aid is supposed to achieve. Encouraging poverty-stricken countries to spend their resources on fighter aircraft and other forms of sophisticated equipment does not seem to many to be productive for either the United States or

recipient nations. On the other hand, opponents of development aid find these programs to be misused and inefficient as well an unnecessary drain on American resources. In addition, they often believe that the goals of such aid are impossible to achieve. Divisions of opinion on these two directions of foreign aid have been so great in Congress that, during the four years under study here, Congress was able to pass only one appropriations bill.

Because changes in the scope and direction of foreign aid are dependent upon changing world events and the perceptions of American interests, strategic concerns have always been important. Before the Reagan administration took office, the nations receiving aid were either important because of their susceptibility to communism or because of strategic locations. In 1978 the top ten countries receiving U.S. economic assistance were in order Egypt, Israel, Portugal, Indonesia, India, Bangladesh, Syria, Jordan, Philippines, and Pakistan.²¹ The Middle East is a top-priority area of foreign policy and, correspondingly, in 1981 37 percent of all bilateral aid funds were targeted to Israel and Egypt.²² Since 1980 Central America has come to be considered important and debates over foreign aid increasingly center around the policy perspectives and appropriations concerning that region.

Another factor besides strategic considerations which is believed to play a role in foreign policy and foreign aid is legislative-executive conflict.²³ Any study of foreign aid issues must take this into consider-

²¹John W. Sewell et al., The United States and World Development: Agenda 1980 (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980), p. 234.

²²CQA 1980, p. 200.

²³See Franck and Weisband; Rousseau; and Malcolm E. Jewell, Senatorial Politics and Foreign Policy (University of Kentucky Press, 1962).

ation. Traditionally, foreign affairs issues have been within the President's domain. The major means available for congressional influence has been control over appropriations.²⁴ The magnitude of this effort can be seen in a study by William L. Morrow, "Legislative Control of Administrative Discretion: The Case of Congress and Foreign Aid." Morrow's research found that cuts in foreign aid from 1955 to 1967 "averaged 20 percent whereas in most other programs a 5 percent cut is about average."²⁵

The reasons for this general congressional attitude revolve around the nature of each side's perspective of the issue.²⁶ The president's major desire is for flexibility in order to handle rapidly changing world events. This conflicts with the congressional duties of oversight which put legislators in the position of desiring certainty and accountability. Because foreign aid is a low priority issue lacking a structured domestic clientele, these oversight duties do not conflict with constituency concerns. Therefore, there is a stronger than usual argument for restricting administrative programs. Specifically, when a member of Congress is confronted with losing funds for a project in his district it is difficult for him to justify a vote for increasing aid to far-off people.²⁷

Cuts in administration funding requests and restrictions on presidential discretion often revolve around the effectiveness and efficiency

²⁴Charles M. Tidmarch and Charles M. Sabatt, "Presidential Leadership Change and Foreign Policy Roll-Call Voting in the U.S. Senate," Western Political Quarterly 25 (December 1972):613.

²⁵Morrow, p. 987.

²⁶Ibid., pp. 985-6, pp. 1004-7.

²⁷CQA 1979, p. 261; CQA 1981, pp. 178-9.

of the programs. In this light both liberals and conservatives have supported Congress over the executive.²⁸ However, the question which remains is what kinds of programs are congressmen willing to fund or not and which ones are they going to restrict and for what reasons. The following literature review will concentrate on the issues behind cuts and restrictions in order to uncover the underlying policy differences senators and representatives have towards foreign aid.

Previous Studies: Issue Divisions

In an analysis based on interviews and an ideology index, Jerrold E. Schneider hypothesized that members of Congress viewed foreign aid within the context of liberal or conservative foreign policy dimensions.²⁹ According to Schneider, ideological divisions on military aid versus economic aid are not clear if the types of aid are viewed separately. These issues are interwoven into each camp's philosophies of economic and world affairs. Furthermore, according to Schneider, congressmen view foreign policy issues within the same ideological dimensions as they view domestic issues.

Briefly, conservative attitudes are seen to center around the Cold War beliefs about a growing communist threat to American security and pluralistic values.³⁰ The Soviet Union is seen to be actively pursuing a policy of subversion in the Third World. Therefore, it is unfortunately necessary to support authoritarian right-wing governments, especially with military aid, because they are the only dependable anti-communist

²⁸See O'Leary, p. 86; and Morrow pp. 1000-2.

²⁹Jerrold E. Schneider, Ideological Coalitions in Congress (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1979).

³⁰Ibid., pp. 63-66, pp. 73-75.

forces. The ensuing anti-communist stability is necessary to encourage outside private investment. This can spur economic development which in turn will hopefully lead to social and political development as well. Under the "trickle down" economic theory direct humanitarian aid will usually do little to solve the systemic problems of Third World nations. Besides, the United States can hardly afford a great deal of such aid. In addition, conservatives take a more revengeful attitude towards Third World countries' efforts to nationalize American business interests. They are more likely to demand full compensation.

On the other hand, the liberal perspective is seen to encompass a multipolar world view.³¹ Nationalism, especially economic nationalism, plays a more significant role in international relations than does communism, ideology or subversion. Therefore, not only does providing large amounts of military aid seem unnecessary but it also diverts resources needed to tackle other problems. In this light, liberals see the changing international situation as requiring an American foreign policy which would be based on new knowledge and would entail a new agenda. The items on the new agenda include the challenges of scarcity, "the international spread of weapons, technology, population upheaval, transnational corporations, communications, and terrorism."³²

According to Schneider, the greatest division between the two ideologies concerns liberal opposition to American intervention to bolster "repressive and exploitative right-wing regimes."³³ Liberals assert that American support for right-wing dictatorships leads to inequality of

³¹Ibid., pp. 63-66, pp. 75-80.

³²Schneider, p. 76.

³³Ibid., p. 78.

political and economic power. This translates into large scale human suffering, not the development envisioned by conservatives. It is these conditions which make countries susceptible to communist takeovers.

Liberals appear to be calling for international cooperation and redistribution efforts aimed at helping to diminish world problems. This would not entail an increase in foreign aid funds as much as it would mean taking funds now going to arm right-wing governments and re-directing these funds as capital contributions to countries with "responsible policies."³⁴ With varying degrees of support the liberal position towards Third World development includes more favorable terms of trade, technology transfers, access to United States markets, humanitarian aid, and other forms of international cooperation. This would supposedly produce much greater long-term and far reaching benefits for both the United States and recipient nations.

Divisions of congressional opinion on the importance of communism in the foreign aid rationale are supported by several studies. In analyzing results of roll call votes, both Truman and Rieselbach reasoned that for many congressmen, the threat of communism provided the necessary ingredient for a favorable foreign aid vote.³⁵ Strings attached to foreign aid bills often prohibited aid to communist nations or required alignment with the "free world" and support for the American position at the

³⁴Ibid., p. 201.

³⁵David B. Truman, "The Domestic Politics of Foreign Aid," Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science 27 (January 1962):70; and Leroy N. Rieselbach, "The Demography of the Congressional Vote on Foreign Aid, 1939-1958," American Political Science Review 58 (September 1964):585.

United Nations.³⁶ At least during the 1970's, however, there was a growing number of congressmen who wanted United States foreign policy to move beyond the simplistic communism-versus-capitalism world view. They offered restrictions to limit United States covert activity in Angola and Nicaragua.³⁷ They have also required the administration to certify that right-wing governments are making progress on human rights in order to receive aid funds.³⁸

The related issue concerning bilateral aid versus multilateral aid has been touted as indicating a difference between national security proponents and development assistance proponents.³⁹ Channeling aid through international agencies is viewed by some as a means to depoliticize aid. Not surprisingly, it is attacked because the United States can not stop such aid from going to communist countries. However, the results of Rousseau's study seem to provide evidence that there is no bilateral-multilateral aid dimension.⁴⁰ It appears that economic views and partisan politics blur any anti-communism versus development cleavage surrounding this issue.

Other analyses, approaching the study of aid from different perspectives, have uncovered different as well as similar issue areas. Michael K. O'Leary categorized amendments to foreign aid bills from 1959 to 1962 into five types.⁴¹ These were (1) economic aid, (2) military

³⁶Westwood, pp. 33-34.

³⁷Franck and Weisband, pp. 49-50, pp. 117-8.

³⁸Ibid., pp. 84-93.

³⁹See Arnold, pp. 69-87, pp. 90-91; and Wall, pp. 66-73.

⁴⁰Rousseau, p. 262.

⁴¹O'Leary, pp. 82-87.

aid, (3) increasing congressional control over the program, 4) assisting the United States economy and (5) influencing or controlling the behavior and policies of other nations. O'Leary found that the Senate was more inclined than the House to pass amendments to the military aid programs and to use foreign aid as a means to help the private sectors of the American economy. The proposals most often approved by the full memberships of both houses were those designed to control the activities of recipient countries. This type of restriction would of course relate to the Cold War concerns and capitalistic economic philosophies already discussed.

O'Leary's fourth category concerning attempts to use aid to benefit the domestic economy was mentioned in several other studies.⁴² Most often alluded to was that the loan, grant, and project restrictions legislated by Congress have insured that close to 90 percent of all aid funds are actually spent in the United States.⁴³ Additionally, more than half of these funds go to large multinational corporations.⁴⁴ An example of such restrictions is the law that requires aid shipments be carried in American ships and purchases be made in the United States. Less easily explained is that for each dollar the United States contributes to the World Bank and the regional development banks about two are spent in the United States economy.⁴⁵ Although for some senators and represen-

⁴²Jewell, p. 175; and Morrow, p. 1006. For early effects on the American economy see Roy Blough, "The Bearing of Foreign Aid on Our Domestic Economy," Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science 27 (January 1962):73-85.

⁴³Black, p. 126; and Michael P. Todaro, Economic Development in the Third World, 2d ed. (New York: Longman, 1981), p. 416.

⁴⁴Lappe', p. 90.

⁴⁵Lappe', p. 90.

tatives this may be a rationale to vote for aid, no analyst reasoned that this constituted a major dimension concerning congressional thinking.

A 1982 study by Morss and Morss described six categories of congressional thinking on foreign aid.⁴⁶ While it lacks the empirical basis of other analyses, it is helpful because it gives a general overview of congressional behavior. The classifications already discussed are the following: (1) congressmen concerned with a humanitarian or moral responsibility;⁴⁷ (2) a combination of those who want to promote national economic, political, or security interests; (3) members who advocate new ideas such as the Peace Corps or multilateral agencies; and (4) the opponents who range from Schneider's description of conservatives to those few who see aid as encouraging the adoption of inappropriate Western development models.

In the fifth Morss and Morss category are numerous single strategy advocates who view "particular development strategies and activities as the solution to poverty." These methods include appropriate technology, population control, integrated rural development or more funds for such items as oil and gas explorations. The sixth group comprises those who are "fence-sitters." These "care very little about foreign aid, in as much as it is a relatively small budgetary item."⁴⁸ They often vote a party line.

While no previous study has specifically analyzed foreign aid

⁴⁶Morss and Morss, pp. 79-83.

⁴⁷For background on the conflict between strategic and humanitarian goals of foreign aid see Lucian Pye, "The Political Impulses and Fantasies Behind Foreign Aid," Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science 27 (January 1962):8-27.

⁴⁸Morss and Morss, p. 81.

roll-call votes in order to define issue dimensions, several empirical works concerning general policy dimensions have produced some insight about how Congress views foreign aid. For the period 1949 to 1950 MacRae used Guttman scaling to construct general issue dimensions, one of which concerned only foreign aid legislation. He found that military aid to Europe (NATO) was seen differently than economic aid (ECA).⁴⁹ MacRae's analysis of 1955 to 1956 found that the military-economic aid distinction remained for Republicans but not for Democrats.⁵⁰ In addition, unlike Schneider and O'Leary, MacRae concluded that foreign aid appeared to be a dimension which congressmen viewed as distinct from their domestic policy opinions.⁵¹

Also seeking general policy dimensions via Guttman scaling procedures, Clausen found foreign aid to be an important policy concept within his international involvement dimension.⁵² Within this dimension aid questions were shown to be distinct from foreign trade, immigration and defense matters. In addition, from 1953 to 1964 and 1969 to 1970, the foreign aid concept appeared to be one of the most general and included, contrary to MacRae's findings, both economic and military aid. This dimension was less general in the Senate than in the House. Clausen reasoned that this was due to the greater "opportunities

⁴⁸Morss and Morss, p. 81.

⁴⁹MacRae, Dimensions of Congressional Voting, p. 237.

⁵⁰Duncan MacRae, Jr., "A Method for Identifying Issues and Fac-tions from Legislative Votes," American Political Science Review 59 (December 1965): 917.

⁵¹*Ibid.*, pp. 922-3.

⁵²Clausen pp. 41-44.

senators have for considering the more detailed aspects of international policy on the floor."⁵³ In the House these dimensions are usually confined to committees and informal exchanges. Finally, the structure of this dimension led Clausen to suggest that the old internationalist-isolationist bipolarization had given way to more of an activist-restrained continuum implying that most members have accepted some international involvement.

There have been numerous roll-call studies of more narrowly defined issue dimensions. The following two analysts employed factor analysis techniques to examine Senate foreign policy issue areas. First, Barry Bozeman and Thomas E. James found seven factors involved in foreign policy voting from 1965 to 1968.⁵⁴ The only factor which was clearly identifiable as a specific issue area concerned military aid versus economic aid. The importance of this cleavage is, however, limited because it explained less than 3 percent of the total variance.

Second, Stephen J. Chimbala studied the foreign policy votes of 1961 to 1962 and, out of thirteen factors, he chose the three major ones for substantive interpretations.⁵⁵ The first dimension represented a broad range of attempts to reduce aid funds and restrict executive powers of discretion with overseas agency funding. The second dimension appeared to show a division of opinion on the funding increases included in final versions of foreign aid bills. The third factor was

⁵³Clausen, p. 42.

⁵⁴Barry Bozeman and Thomas E. James, "Toward a Comprehensive Model of Foreign Policy Voting in the Senate," Western Political Quarterly 28 (September 1975):477-95.

⁵⁵Stephen J. Chimbala, "Foreign Policy as an Issue Area: A Roll Call Analysis," American Political Science Review 63 (March 1969):148-56.

similar to the first except that the latter more specifically revolved around foreign aid questions. These results highlight the issue of spending over other issues. Unlike MacRae, Chimbala suggests that because Senators divided along spending questions, they probably view foreign aid much like they do domestic economic issues.⁵⁶

The empirical studies seem to give some credence to oversight duties being of paramount concern. Factor analysis and Guttman scaling have, at least, not been able to show that there are differences in voting patterns concerning other underlying issue areas. However, other studies taking different tacts have identified a variety of dimensions. Most relevant to the current analysis are anti-communism, national security, military aid, economic aid, ideological perspectives of congressmen, and the recipient country's type of government. The next question to be answered pertains to the effects of certain personal and constituency characteristics on congressional foreign aid issue divisions.

Previous Studies: Independent Variables

Although previous vote studies have centered around more general dimensions, their conclusions offer a great deal of information about the effects of party, ideology, and demographic characteristics on congressional voting patterns. Analysts' interpretations and historical contexts will be applied in order to provide a theoretical foundation for a more narrowly-defined analysis.

The variable which appears to have had the greatest effect on foreign aid voting behavior is region. In fact, both Clausen and Truman

⁵⁶Also see O'Leary, p. 123.

cite it as one of the best long-term indicators of opinion.⁵⁷ Most researchers, however, have found the effect of region increases when it is used in relation with other variables. Studying part or all of the years 1939 to 1962 Jewell, Rieselbach, and Shannon all found sectional differences were greater within each political party than they were generally.⁵⁸ Briefly, previous studies most often found that opposition to foreign aid came from the Southern and Mountain regions of both parties and from Midwest Republicans. A more activist position was taken by Northern Democrats and Coastal Republicans.

Most of the attention to regional differences has focused on the South. While Southern Republicans have always been opposed to foreign aid, Southern Democrats did not begin to disagree with their party's favorable attitude until the 1950s. Jewell reasoned that this shift came from fiscal conservatism as well as from a desire to protect southern cotton, tobacco and recent industrialization from Third World competition.⁵⁹ This group's divisions over military aid and economic aid have not been conclusive. Evidence, however, that the above conclusions about party and region are tenuous can be found in Demack's finding that during the mid-1970s neither factor contributed consistently to foreign aid opinions.⁶⁰

⁵⁷Clausen, p. 171; and Truman, "The Domestic Politics of Foreign Aid," p. 67.

⁵⁸Jewell, pp. 49-52; Rieselbach, pp. 581-3; and W. Wayne Shannon, Party, Constituency and Congressional Voting: A Study of Legislative Behavior in the United States House of Representatives (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1968), p. 90-92.

⁵⁹Jewell, pp. 24-26. Also see Rieselbach, pp. 578-9.

⁶⁰Gary C. Demack, "Demographic Determinants of Senators' Roll-call Voting Positions on Foreign Aid Legislation: 1947-1974" (Masters' thesis, Florida Atlantic University, 1976), p. 65.

While it is difficult and oversimplifying to label outright party positions, it appears that Republicans have usually been more concerned with restrictions and Democrats more supportive of technical assistance.⁶¹ Party, at least until 1964, was considered to be the most significant single factor. However, even then Schneier found ideological differences replacing party in importance.⁶² Rieselbach also concluded that party had ceased to be important, but he saw urban and ethnic characteristics rising in importance.⁶³ In addition, Clausen labeled party a weak predictor of foreign policy positions.⁶⁴

One of the most often studied relationships between variables has been the effect a presidential change can make in party support. O'Leary and Jewell found that many members of each party became more activist when their party controlled the White House.⁶⁵ There is evidence that, at least until 1964, party differences were greater under Democratic administrations.⁶⁶ This stems from the finding that Republicans were generally more isolationist while Democrats were more internationalist. A Republican president usually meant that many Republicans could be persuaded to support their party's president and vote for aid programs they might normally have opposed. Fewer Democrats would see

⁶¹O'Leary, p. 59.

⁶²Julius Turner, Party and Constituency: Pressures on Congress, rev. ed. Edward V. Schneier, Jr. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970), pp. 239-244.

⁶³Rieselbach, p. 587.

⁶⁴Clausen, p. 168.

⁶⁵O'Leary, pp. 60-69; and Jewell, pp. 14-17, pp. 35-43, p. 52.

⁶⁶Turner, pp. 62-68. This was reconfirmed by Clausen in 1973. See pp. 179, 199-206.

the need to change their internationalist stance and thus a Republican president would have bipartisan approval of an internationalist policy. Under a Democratic president most Republicans would return to their previous positions and the party divisions would become more pronounced.

Tidmarch and Sabatt, however, found party members were not all that susceptible to changes in the party of the President. During the 1960s an average of 70 percent of the senators did not change their foreign aid judgments with a change in party control of the White House.⁶⁷ These authors associated most of the changes to years when foreign policy issues were consciously promoted as partisan.

Another standard belief is that urban areas have been more supportive of the activist position than rural areas. There is, however, disagreement among researchers concerning urban-rural cleavages within parties and regions. MacRae found it a factor within regions and for the Republicans, but not for the Democrats.⁶⁸ Turner and Scheier, on the other hand, concluded that Democrats split along these lines more than Republicans.⁶⁹ They reasoned that Democratic rural seats come most often from the rural South.⁷⁰ This division of opinion was partly attributable to rural congressmen being more cohesively concerned with communism than their urban colleagues.

To support his belief that relatively little of the anti-aid sentiment was explained by urban and rural characteristics, Truman identified

⁶⁷Tidmarch and Sabatt, pp. 618-20.

⁶⁸MacRae, Dimensions of Congressional Voting, pp. 276-7.

⁶⁹Turner, pp. 127-9, 244-5.

⁷⁰Turner, pp. 165-7.

pockets of last-ditch urban opposition.⁷¹ The very few Northeasterners opposed to aid came from urban areas. While the South and Midwest provided most of the opposition, the strongest negative voting records came from the highly urban, industrial, Midwest states and from six Republican districts in Los Angeles. The important qualification in all this might be that while members from more populous states have been very supportive of international involvements, those from sparsely populated rural states have also been supportive, but less so.⁷²

As far as ideology is concerned, Bozeman and James found it to be the only variable explaining their military aid versus economic aid factor.⁷³ Conservatives favored military aid while liberals favored the economic variety. Although MacRae and Turner discovered party to be distinct from ideology, they believed that differences between support or opposition to international involvement depends just as much on which party controls the presidency.⁷⁴

If attitudes towards Third World versus American nationalism can be implied from votes on the Panama Canal Treaties, then ideological interpretations have additional credibility. McCormick and Black found ideology to be a strong indicator of treaty votes. In this case, liberals were defined as those making an effort "to work with other states as equals..., to reduce international tension, and to move toward peaceful

⁷¹Truman, "The Domestic Politics of Foreign Aid," p. 68.

⁷²See Demack, p. 67.

⁷³Bozeman and James, pp. 491-2.

⁷⁴Turner, p. 245, 62; and MacRae, Issues and Parties, p. 188.

change through diplomacy."⁷⁵ Conservatives were distinguished by their desire to maintain the status quo, to defeat challenges to America's position in the world, and to stop communist expansion.

Of course, the most support for an ideological explanation comes from Schneider's interviews and vote study. While ideological continuums have been suspect for a long time⁷⁶ they still are a measure of the degree to which Congress views any specific issue in relation to all others. Clausen criticized the liberal-conservative distinctions because they too often placed liberals as internationalists and conservatives as isolationists.⁷⁷ According to Schneider, McCormick, and Black, that just might not be the correct description of the ideological continuum.

The effects of committees on foreign aid policy was found to be an important factor until the 1950s. Rieselbach suggested the effects of committee membership had survived controls for party and time at least up to 1958.⁷⁸ He reasoned that contact with foreign affairs officials socialized committee members towards a more informed and supportive attitude. Demack, however, found no evidence of an effect from 1953 to 1974.⁷⁹ The decline of committee solidarity fits into the idea that foreign aid perspectives have become more ideological.

Rieselbach supplies the most specific combination of variables to

⁷⁵James M. McCormick and Michael Black, "Ideology and Senate Voting on the Panama Canal Treaties," Legislative Studies Quarterly 8 (February 1983):49.

⁷⁶Clausen, pp. 38-39.

⁷⁷Ibid, pp. 100-101.

⁷⁸Rieselbach, p. 580.

⁷⁹Demack, p. 65.

explain foreign aid votes.⁸⁰ Generally, supporters were found to be from coastal, high ethnic, more educated and wealthier districts while opposition mainly came from Southern and Mountain regions, low ethnic, less educated, poorer and more rural districts. He reasoned that ethnic support came from the large immigrant groups from Germany and Ireland who had begun to view alliance with Britain as less dangerous than the communist threat from the Soviet Union. Constituents from higher socioeconomic districts, Rieselbach believed, had more information and more concern about foreign policy and thus, they were more willing to approve involvements. These generalizations, however, pertained to an era when most researchers discussed foreign policy cleavages within the limited context of support or opposition.

Summary

The literature review has highlighted the complexity of congressional thinking towards foreign aid. The problem of previous research appears to be that foreign policy and foreign aid questions were usually studied from either an internationalist-isolationist dimension or from an activist-restrained continuum. The analysis of how independent variables contribute to Senate and House voting records especially point out that there are significant differences of opinion on aid. This study is based on the assumption that most members of Congress recognize the world leadership position of the United States. Therefore, most are in favor of some type of world involvement. Hopefully the research design, discussed in the next chapter, will facilitate the rediscovery of who is for what type of foreign aid.

⁸⁰Rieselbach, pp. 583, 587.

CHAPTER II

RESEARCH DESIGN

In order to maintain as much objectivity as possible, this study followed a rather involved procedure to define issue dimensions. The operationalization of congressional attitudes was divided into the following four stages: vote selection; vote categorization; determination of valid dimensions; and index construction. The independent variables were operationalized by methods used by previous analysts.

The research design was developed to test three hypotheses. The first set of expectations pertains to issue dimensions and was based mostly on Schneider's descriptions of congressional foreign policy positions. The other two hypotheses were formulated from a combination of variables that have most often been cited as having effects on foreign policy voting positions. The hypotheses are stated as follows:

1. Congressional orientations towards foreign aid most likely are divided along the lines of two dimensions which will be labeled pro-development and traditional. The traditional dimension will include congressmen more likely to view aid as a means to ensure a stable investment climate or to make a strong stand against "communist expansionism." This position will more likely be translated into support for right-wing governments and the type of aid most favored will usually be military assistance. On the opposite side, prodevelopment congressmen will be more likely to view the capitalism-versus-communism-socialism world view as oversimplistic and

will instead tend to see it in the national interest to allocate public funds and technology transfers to help solve Third World problems. This position will more likely mean favoring aid to moderate or left-wing governments and the type of aid supported will usually be economic.

2. The traditional dimension will more likely be supported by conservatives, non-Northeastern Republicans, members from Mountain and Southern states, and members from states or districts with lower median incomes.

3. The prodevelopment dimension will more likely be supported by liberals, Democrats, Easterners of both parties, members from states or districts with higher median incomes, and members from urban areas.

Operationalization of Issue Dimensions

Initial Vote Selection

The initial steps of the research process concerned an involved procedure to choose votes which would satisfactorily identify the issue dimensions of foreign aid as perceived by the representatives and senators of the 95th and 96th Congresses. At first, all House and Senate roll-call votes pertaining to foreign aid legislation from 1979 to 1982 were found in the Congressional Quarterly Almanacs. Votes were not chosen if they were on procedural motions and if a clear for or against position on the type of aid in question could not be ascertained.¹ Votes

¹Examples of votes easily omitted because of an unclear positive or negative aid attitude include a vote to require the administration to study ways to counter Libyan terrorism; a vote to remove the Peace Corps from ACTION; and a vote to approve President Carter's reorganization of foreign aid. Other votes involved a more subjective decision. One example is tabling a motion to remove some specific equipment from

were immediately excluded (1) if less than 75 percent of the members had voted, had been paired, or had announced a position or (2) if the division of votes was greater than an 80 percent majority opposing a 20 percent minority. The rationale for eliminating votes approaching unanimity and for eliminating votes with low rates of participation are that such votes are of little value in distinguishing divisions and they lead to distortion of the product-moment coefficient upon which factor analysis is constructed.² These criteria caused twelve votes to be dropped from the House data set and eight votes from the Senate.

Two other modifications were necessary to ensure that repetitious votes would not unduly combine to become one dimension by themselves. First, for several authorization and appropriation bills there were roll-calls on both first passage and on the conference report. For these bills, only the final vote of each session was included, thus excluding three votes from each data set. Second, other repetitious votes were deleted if there was either a series of votes on slightly modified amendments to the same bill or votes on similar amendments to different bills. In such cases, every effort was made to choose only those votes which indicated a cleavage of opinion and eliminate those which were obviously strategy votes. In most instances the vote on the final version of the

the list of munitions requiring approval before being sold to foreign concerns. This motion could either be interpreted as a pro military aid proposal or as a decision with unclear positions. In retrospect, the author probably erred on the side of omitting these types of votes.

²James W. Riddlesperger, Jr. and James D. King, "Energy Votes in the U.S. Senate," The Journal of Politics 44 (November 1982):841; and Chimbala, p. 151. For additional discussion of vote selection see Bozeman and James, p. 481; Schneider, pp. 111-5; and Lee F. Anderson, Meredith W. Watts, Jr., and Allen R. Wilcox, Legislative Roll-Call Analysis (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966), pp. 78-84.

amendment was chosen and the others excluded. This criterion eliminated eighteen votes from the House data and nine from the Senate.

The selection process described above yielded forty votes for the House and forty-eight for the Senate. At this point it is necessary to briefly discuss the limitations of the data as well as the expectations for its use.³ One limitation is that roll-call votes provide an incomplete picture of the decision-making process. They do not capture bargaining in committee, negotiations and voice votes on the floor, or the success of the executive and legislative leaders' powers of persuasion. A second limitation is that a vote may not be what it appears to be. For example, a congressman may vote one way one time and differently another time. This may happen for a variety of reasons including strategy to get a final version of a bill passed or defeated.

The expectations of the roll-call analyst must be such that the above reservations are taken into consideration while selecting votes and interpreting the results of the study. The chief advantage of roll-call votes is that they are readily available, hard facts, a type of data usually difficult for social scientists to obtain. They serve as the best record of the positions taken by senators and representatives. It is in analyzing the positions of congressmen that roll-call votes are used in the present study. As final outcomes of the policy-making process roll-call votes are, as Clausen states, "heavily influenced by the general policy positions of congressmen."⁴ By being sensitive to the policy content they can provide the basis to infer the influence of other fac-

³For discussions of the pros and cons of roll call analyses see Chimbala, p. 152; MacRae, Dimensions of Congressional Voting, p. 216; Turner, pp. 7-13; and Schneider, pp. 91-105.

⁴Clausen, p. 9.

tors such as party, ideology and constituency upon the policy-making outcomes.

Once the votes were selected, the next step was deciding how to handle changes in House and Senate membership within the time periods in which Congress voted on foreign aid questions. In the 95th House three seats changed hands so that the total number of representatives became 437. During the 96th House, four members were replaced. One new representative, Katie Hall of Indiana, was not included because she had not voted in more than one-half the foreign aid decisions during at least one session. Representative William R. Cotter of Connecticut was eliminated because before being replaced he had not voted on any foreign aid bill. Therefore, the 96th House data consisted of 436 representatives. Although one senator in each Congress resigned and was replaced, all senators were included in the vote tabulations. The additional senator in each Congress raised the total for each Senate to 101.

Vote Categorization

A factor analysis of the roll-call votes was performed in order to categorize votes into issue areas. This helped to ensure that the operationalization of each issue area closely approximated the actual thinking of the representatives and senators.⁵ For the factor analysis the votes

⁵While factor analysis has usually been used to identify groups and the degrees of cohesion or disagreement between these groups, some have begun to use it to identify issues. For example, see Chimbala; Bozeman and James; and Paul Burstein, "A New Method for Measuring Legislative Content and Change: Senate Voting on Vietnam War Bills," Sociological Methods and Research 6 (February 1978):340-44.

For an understanding of factor analysis procedures, the present study mostly relied upon Anderson, Watts, and Wilcox, pp. 123-74; Judith M. Tanur et al., Statistics: A Guide to Political and Social Issues (San Francisco: Holden-Day, 1977), pp. 100-113; and Norman H. Nie et al., Statistical Package for the Social Sciences, 2d ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1975), pp. 468-514.

were coded with 1 signifying support for the type of aid in question, a zero for not voting and a -1 for opposition. This scheme was chosen for two reasons. First, the numerical values have some intuitive justification based on placing missing values between positive and negative votes. Absences coded in this way lessened the possibility that absences would skew the scores towards either side of the continuum. Second, the values assigned are compatible with most computer routines for factor analysis since the correlation coefficient generated is a Pearson product-moment statistic.⁶

The inclusion of absences in the computations was necessary because otherwise the SPSS factor analysis subprogram would have eliminated all members who failed to vote on any one roll-call.⁷ That would have left only about one-third of the congressmen for analysis. In order to utilize as much data as possible in the computation of each simple coefficient, pairwise deletion of missing data was employed. A case was thus included in the computations of all simple correlation coefficients for which it had complete data and omitted only when the value of either of the variables being considered was missing.

The factoring method employed was principal factoring with iterations which means that the number of factors extracted was determined by the number of factors with an eigenvalue greater than or equal to 1.0; the diagonals of the correlation matrix were initially replaced by squared multiple correlations; and the iteration was stopped if the convergence reached the .001 criterion. An orthogonal method of ro-

⁶See Anderson, Watts and Wilcox, pp. 149-59; Chimbala, p. 151; and Nie et al., pp. 469-80.

⁷Nie et al., p. 504.

tation was used in which the simplification of the data concentrated on the columns, or factors, of the factor matrix.

Determination of Valid Dimensions

The results of the factor analysis were first examined according to the heaviest loading variables. The votes and their loadings are given in table 1. The cut-off point for inclusion in the tables is a loading of $\pm .50$. Although this figure is arbitrary, it seems to have become conventional.⁸ Each factor was surveyed in order to ascertain its conceptual meaning. There are, of course, shades of differences among the factors across data sets, but there are also enough similarities to identify comparable factors for each House and Senate. In all four data sets one factor focuses exclusively on funding decisions and, naturally, these factors were named "funding." A second group of factors revolved around a variety of legislative efforts to restrict policy, formulate policy, or cut expenditures. Since each of these factors is not related to any specific issue areas, they will be called "general." Third factors were chosen for both chambers of the 95th Congress. Since these additional dimensions appear to be more concerned with the ideological inclinations of governments receiving American aid, they will be labeled "recipient."

At this point the results of the factor analysis have necessitated a change in the terminology to be used throughout the remainder of this paper. It was earlier hypothesized that there would be prodevelopment and traditional dimensions. However, no such dimensions are attributable to individual factors. Therefore, these concepts will be referred

⁸Bozeman and James, p. 482. Chimbala also used .50 as a cut-off point.

TABLE 1
LOADINGS FOR THE ROTATED FACTOR MATRICES

95th House

Factor 1 "General"

Loading	Vote Description ¹
.80	Ban direct and indirect aid to Angola, the Central African Empire, Cambodia, Laos or Vietnam, passed. (N), 79-400.
.72	Ban International Development Association (IDA) funds to Vietnam, passed. (N), 79-324.
.71	Reduce funds to the U.N. Development Fund to the fiscal 1979 level, passed. (N), 79-396.
.68	Stipulate that bans on aid to communist countries would not prevent aid to Egypt, Israel, or any other country not specifically barred, rejected. (Y), 79-399.
.67	Cut foreign assistance appropriations across-the-board by 4%, except aid intended for Egypt and Israel, passed. (N), 79-404.
.66	Delete authorization of arms sales credits to Panama, passed. (N), 79-60.
.63	Amendment to prohibit economic assistance to Panama, passed. (N), 79-69.
.62	Delete military aid to Nicaragua from fiscal 1981 foreign aid authorization bill, passed. (N), 80-238.
.61	Prohibit a \$359.5 million U.S. payment to the Asian Development Bank unless Taiwan permitted to continue its membership in the bank, passed. (N), 79-325.
.53	Cut authorizations across-the-board by 10% except for Egypt, Israel and several specific programs, passed. (N), 80-271.
.53	Prohibit funds to any schools in Nicaragua that housed, employed, or were made available to Cuban personnel, passed. (N), 80-75.
.50	Restore House cuts in contributions to development banks, passed. (N), 80-166.

¹Following each vote description a (Y) or an (N) indicates which position was coded as a vote in favor of sending the type of aid in question. The numbers at the end of each description concern where the tabulation of each vote was found in the CQA. The numbers to the left of the hyphen indicate the year and those to the right identify the CQA vote number.

TABLE 1 -- ContinuedFactor 2 "Funding"

- .79 Fiscal 1980 foreign aid appropriations bill. First vote, passed. (Y), 79-406.
- .78 Fiscal 1980 economic and military aid authorization bill. First vote, passed. (Y), 80-272.
- .74 Fiscal 1980 economic aid authorization bill. Conference report, passed. (Y), 79-390.
- .66 Cut fiscal 1980 appropriations across-the-board by 5% including funding for programs in Egypt and Israel, rejected. (N), 79-402.
- .63 Fiscal 1980 military aid authorization bill. Conference report, passed. (Y), 79-510.
- .57 Delete appropriation for the Institute for Scientific and Technological Cooperation, rejected. (N), 79-398.
- .55 Eliminate appropriation for replenishment funds to the International Development Association, rejected. (N), 79-323.
- .54 Development banks authorization bill. Conference report, passed. (Y), 80-224.

Factor 3 "Recipient"

- .74 Authorize ESF aid to Nicaragua and require the President to report to Congress on Nicaraguan observance of human rights, passed. (Y), 80-269.
- .71 Motion to concur in the Senate foreign aid amendment and add \$80 million in aid to Nicaragua to the fiscal 1980 supplemental appropriations bill, passed. (Y), 80-363.
- .67 Require local currency generated by the U.S. loan program to Nicaragua be used for loans to the private sector through Nicaraguan or American private financial institutions, rejected. (Y), 80-71.
- .60 Delete sending observers to elections in southern Africa and delete requiring \$20 million in assistance to Zimbabwe-Rhodesia once elections were held in that country, passed. (N), 79-73.
- .55 \$75 million to Nicaragua and \$5 million to Honduras in supplemental economic aid authorizations, passed. (Y), 80-77.
- .55 Amendment to reduce by \$16.7 million the appropriations for the African Development Fund, rejected. (N), 79-332.
- .50 Amendment to prohibit any aid to Nicaragua without prior congressional approval, rejected. (N), 79-405.

TABLE 1 -- Continued

95th Senate

Factor 1 "Funding"

- .70 Fiscal 1980 military aid authorization bill. First vote, passed. (Y), 70-107.
- .70 Fiscal 1980 economic aid authorization bill. First vote, passed. (Y), 79-137.
- .69 Fiscal 1980 foreign aid appropriations bill. First vote, passed. (Y), 79-347.
- .62 Contributions to international development banks authorizations for fiscal 1980-83, passed. (Y), 79-101.
- .61 Authorize contributions to the International Development Association and the African Development Bank, passed. (Y), 80-209.
- .60 Reduce military aid authorizations by \$56 million, rejected. (N), 79-106.
- .56 Fiscal 1981 foreign military and economic aid authorization bill. Conference report, passed. (Y), 80-484.

Factor 2 "General"

- .86 Delete prohibition on direct and indirect aid to Angola, the Central African Republic, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, passed. (Y), 79-337.
- .78 Delete prohibition on indirect aid to Cuba from language in bill prohibiting all aid to Cuba, passed. (Y), 79-340.
- .75 Delete prohibition on the IDA's use of U.S. contributions to aid Vietnam, passed. (Y), 79-333.
- .63 Amendment to appropriate \$15.5 million more than the House for the Asian Development Bank, passed. (Y), 79-334.
- .57 Delete prohibition on bilateral aid to Mozambique, rejected. (Y), 79-336.
- .50 Amendment to appropriate \$826 million for the World Bank rather than \$163 million approved by the House, passed. (Y), 79-332.

Factor 3 "Recipient"

- .81 Authorize \$75 million to Nicaragua and \$5 million to Honduras, passed. (Y), 80-148.
- .74 Table amendment to delete appropriation for aid to Nicaragua, passed. (Y), 80-272.
- .67 Table amendment to allow the president to provide military aid to Nicaragua, passed. (N), 80-213.

TABLE 1 -- Continued

- .65 Table amendment to reduce amount of aid to Nicaragua and Honduras and to authorize aid to El Salvador and Guatemala, passed. (N), 80-16.
- .64 Senate bill authorizing aid to Nicaragua and Honduras and military aid to certain Caribbean and Central American nations, passed. (Y), 80-17.

96th House

Factor 1 "Funding"

- .87 Fiscal 1982 Foreign aid appropriations bill. Conference report, passed. (Y), 81-348.
- .83 Fiscal 1982 foreign aid authorization bill. First vote, passed. (Y), 81-327.
- .55 Amendment to reduce U.S. contributions to the International Development Association to \$534.6 million from \$540 million, passed. (N), 81-32.
- .52 Appropriate \$350 million for the Caribbean Basin Initiative, passed. (Y), 82-281.

Factor 2 "General"

- .66 Amendment to appropriate funds for Military Assistance Grants. (The principle effects of the amendment were to eliminate \$20 million in military aid to El Salvador and halve the amount for Somalia.) Passed. (Y), 82-282.
- .66 Prohibit use of funds to improve, construct, or expand any airfield in Honduras, rejected. (N), 82-255.
- .65 Bill to provide duty-free entry into the U.S. of certain products from most Caribbean nations and to allow tax deductions for expenses of conventions held in the Caribbean, passed. (Y), 82-447.
- .60 Require at least 50% of Agency for International Development bilateral assistance funds be used to finance projects benefiting those living in absolute poverty, passed. (Y), 82-419.
- .54 Amendment to put quota on duty-free rum from Caribbean nations allowed to enter the U.S., rejected. (N), 82-447.

96th Senate

Factor 1 "General"

- .86 Table repealing the prohibition on military aid and arms sales to Chile, rejected. (N), 81-321.
- .79 Table reducing by one-half the funding for the CBI, passed. (Y), 82-304.

TABLE 1 -- Continued

- .78 Change human rights conditions on aid to El Salvador into a statement of the sense of Congress that progress should be made, rejected. (Y), 81-275.
- .78 Delete approximately \$600 million for military and economic aid for fiscal 1982, rejected. (N), 82-303.
- .76 Amendment to add \$30 million in Food for Peace aid to Poland, rejected. (Y), 81-465.
- .76 Table amendment to bar use of funds for airfield improvement projects in Honduras, passed. (Y), 82-204.
- .76 Table amendment which attached conditions concerning elections in Namibia to repeal of a ban on covert aid to military factions in Angola, passed. (Y), 81-296.
- .73 Require aid cut-off to Pakistan and India if either exploded a nuclear device in the future, passed. (N), 81-314.
- .68 Table amendment to bar covert aid to support irregular or paramilitary forces in Central America, passed. (Y), 82-441.
- .63 Prohibit aid to any nation in which U.S. property had been attacked and full compensation had not been made (restriction aimed at Pakistan), rejected. (N), 81-379.
- .62 Reconsider vote which had defeated an amendment to provide an ESF contingency fund, passed. (Y), 81-325.

Factor 2 "Funding"

- .82 Fiscal 1982-83 foreign aid authorization bill. Conference report, passed. (Y), 81-476.
 - .79 Fiscal 1982 foreign aid appropriations bill. Conference report, passed. (Y), 81-483.
 - .73 Amendment to budget resolution to eliminate funding for all foreign aid programs, rejected. (N), 82-128.
 - .70 Table reducing foreign aid outlays to maintain fiscal 1982 levels through fiscal 1985, passed. (Y), 82-147.
 - .64 Table \$700 million limit on International Development Association appropriation, rejected. (Y), 82-449.
 - .54 Cut foreign aid programs by 4% in fiscal 1982 continuing appropriations bill, passed. (N), 81-408.
 - .53 Authorization bill for the sixth replenishment to the International Development Association and for contributions to the African Development Bank, passed. (Y), 81-87.
 - .51 Amendment to fund foreign aid programs in the fiscal 1983 continuing appropriations bill, passed. (Y), 82-418.
-

to as positions and this study will attempt to test their applicability to the positions found at the ends of the funding, general, and recipient dimensions.

Identifying the important factors and making substantive interpretations posed little problem for the 96th Congress. In the House there were only two factors, one explaining 56.3 percent of the variance and the other 43.3 percent (see table 2). The Senate data produced four factors, the major two explaining 53.3 and 36.9 percent of the variance. In both chambers of the 95th Congress the factor analysis showed divisions of opinion centering around one major issue area. In the House the general policy dimension is overwhelmingly the dominant factor. While the proportion of variation explained by the funding and recipient factors was minor, they are included in order to maintain the consistency of dimensions across data sets and because they revolve around

TABLE 2
PROPORTION OF VARIANCE EXPLAINED BY EACH FACTOR

95th Congress			
House		Senate	
Factor	% of Variance	Factor	% of Variance
*1	86.3	*1	73.2
*2	8.0	*2	11.0
*3	5.8	*3	7.5
		4	4.5
		5	3.8
96th Congress			
House		Senate	
Factor	% of Variance	Factor	% of Variance
*1	56.3	*1	53.3
*2	43.3	*2	36.9
		3	6.1
		4	3.7

*Designates factor chosen as major issue area.

around identifiable issues which recieved a great deal of attention in committee and floor debates.

For the 95th Senate the dominant issue is funding. The general policy question dimension, explaining only eleven percent of the variance, is the weakest general factor. Compared to the range of issues included on the other general factors, this one is the most limited. All six votes were part of a series of amendments pertaining to the multi-lateral aid portion of the 1979 appropriations bill. The recipient factor in the 95th Senate was also less inclusive than its counterpart in the House. A more thorough analysis of the issues involved in all ten factors is delayed until chapter three.

Index Construction

The final stage in operationalizing the issue dimensions was the construction of indexes from the major factors.⁹ Votes for each dimension index were selected if the vote loaded with a coefficient of .50 or greater on the factor. Each vote then became an equal indicator of its particular dimension. At this point two changes in the vote coding were necessary to standardize the indicators. First, the coding for votes with negative loadings was reversed so that a -1 represented the negative end of the dimension and a 1 the positive end. Second, the codes for the 96th House and Senate general dimensions were switched. The policy positions indicated by a 1 on these votes had been similar to the positions coded -1 for the general factors in the other Congress.

⁹The construction and use of indexes were formulated from Mary Grisez Kweit and Robert W. Kweit, Concepts and Methods for Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1981), pp. 167-9; and Anderson, Watts, and Wilcox, pp. 15-28.

Reversing the positive and negative signs helped avoid undue confusion in interpreting results.

Index scores were computed for each congressman by adding the member's vote on each bill and dividing by the total number of roll-calls. This produced a continuum of scores ranging from -1 to 1. The inclusion of missing values, coded as zero, in the index construction moved the index scores towards the middle range. For example, if a congressman voted for aid five of six opportunities but did not vote the sixth time, then his score would be .83 instead of 1. This skewing could easily have been corrected by dividing the raw score by the number of times the member voted rather than by the number of roll-calls. However, all other vote computations used in this study included missing values, so it was reasoned that in the interest of consistency the index score would not be different. These scores enabled the creation of variables representing conceptually understandable cleavages in the voting patterns of each house during each congress. These dimensions will be used as dependent variables in multiple regression analyses aimed at inferring the influences of constituency and personal characteristics upon congressional foreign aid positions.

Operationalization of Independent Variables

The independent variables in the regression are mostly straightforward operationalizations.¹⁰ The constituency variables include re-

¹⁰For further discussions concerning independent variable operationalizations see Clausen, pp. 151-66; Shannon, pp. 117-9; Bozeman and James, pp. 481-4; Lewis A. Froman, Jr., Congressmen and Their Constituencies (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1963), p. 91; and John E. Jackson, Constituencies and Leaders in Congress: Their Effects on Senate Voting Behavior (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), pp. 147-59.

gion, median income and metropolitan population. The personal characteristics are party and ideology. The data on the constituencies are 1970 United States Census statistics.¹¹ The value used for metropolitan population is the percentage of citizens living within Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs). For most of the states and districts a SMSA is defined as a county or group of contiguous counties which contains at least one city or "twin cities" of 50,000 or more residents.¹² Rural areas are those not defined as metropolitan. The choice of this statistic is based on Turner's reasonings. Since the census designation of urban areas includes those living in towns or cities as small as 2,500, he felt that the SMSAs were a more realistic description of urban-rural constituencies.¹³

The regional categories were based on the following classification of states:¹⁴

Northeast:	Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Connecticut Rhode Island, Massachusetts
Middle Atlantic:	New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware
East North Central:	Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin
West North Central:	Iowa, Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas

¹¹U.S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Congressional District Data Book, 93rd Congress (A Statistical Abstract Supplement), 1973; and Congressional District Data: 94th Congress, CDD no. 94-1 Texas, 94-2 California, and 94-3 New York, 1974.

Regretfully, the changes, sometimes drastic, within congressional districts and states are not accounted for in this study because the 1980 census figures had not been compiled as of this study's data compilations.

¹²U.S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Congressional District Data Book, 93rd Congress, p. xi.

¹³Turner, p. 110.

¹⁴Clausen, p. 161.

Mountain:	Montana, Wyoming, Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, Idaho, Nevada, Arizona
Pacific:	California, Oregon, Washington, Alaska, Hawaii
Border:	Missouri, Maryland, West Virginia, Oklahoma. Kentucky, Tennessee
South:	Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, Texas, Arkansas

The categories used to test the second hypothesis were Mountain and South. For the third hypothesis a combination of Northeast and Middle Atlantic were used to represent Eastern representatives and senators.

In order for nominal data such as region and party to meet the interval level measurement assumption in linear regression analysis, nominal data are transformed into dummy variables. This is fairly easy when only specific categories are being used. All members from a chosen category such as Mountain are coded as 1 and all others as zero. The study also uses additional regressions which include all regional categories. In this case the coding system is applied to seven of the eight regional groups. Dummy coding the eighth region is redundant because its members are already identified as not being a member of the seven other regions.¹⁵

Ideology scores are Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) ratings for "liberalism" on both domestic and foreign policies.¹⁶ The annual scores were averaged in order to have one score representative of the congressmen's relative ideological position for each data set. A low score indicates a more conservative member while a high score identifies a more liberal one. As far as ideology ratings go, the ADA's results are considered to be one of the best and have been used by poli-

¹⁵Nie et al., pp. 347-81. Also discussed by Clausen, p. 191.

¹⁶Found in CQA 1979-82.

tical scientists such as McCormick and Black.¹⁷ Another justification of this variable is that ADA scores are comparable to those compiled by other groups and means. For example, according to a path analysis done by Bullock and Brady, there was a fair amount of similarity between the ADA and Conservative Coalition.¹⁸

¹⁷Bozeman and James also used a liberal-conservative scale, although they did not say what it was. Schneider developed his own ideology measurement.

¹⁸Charles S. Bullock III and David W. Brady, "Party, Constituency, and Roll Call Voting in the U.S. Senate," Legislative Studies Quarterly 8 (February 1983):29-43. Conservative Coalition scores are computed annually by the Congressional Quarterly.

CHAPTER III

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The basic ingredient of this research is delineating congressional opinion on foreign aid into a small number of comprehensible issue dimensions. The four data sets produced a total of ten indexes easily classified into two groups, funding and policy questions. An in depth look at these representations of issue dimensions will hopefully provide some insights into, first, what congressional attitudes might be and, second, how closely the hypothesized positions are to those existing from 1979 to 1982.

Issue Dimensions

Funding

One dimension focusing solely on funding questions appeared in each data set. For the most part these four factors were similar in composition.¹ Each included all the votes to pass the authorization and appropriations bills, most of the votes on multilateral funding, and at least one amendment to cut aid spending levels. The positive end of each continuum represents approval for funding the types of aid programs included in the bills.

There were few specific differences between the types of votes

¹See table 3 for synopses of the funding dimension indexes. For a more complete description of the votes included on each index see table 1.

TABLE 3

SYNOPSIS OF FUNDING DIMENSION INDEXES

95th House:	Economic and military aid appropriations and authorizations--more economic aid than military aid (5). ¹ Multilateral aid authorizations (2). Funds for the Institute for Scientific and Technical Cooperation (1). Across-the-board cut in aid funds (1).
95th Senate:	Economic and military aid authorizations--more economic aid than military aid (3). Multilateral aid authorizations (2). Cut in military aid authorizations (1).
96th House:	Economic and military aid appropriations and authorizations--more military aid than economic aid (2). Funds for the Caribbean Basin Initiative (1). Cuts in multilateral funds (1).
96th Senate:	Cuts in or limits on aid funding levels (4). Economic and military aid appropriations and authorizations--more military aid than economic aid (3). Multilateral aid authorization (1).

¹Number in parentheses indicates number of votes on the subjects that are included in the index.

included in the House and Senate factors. The two odd votes both concerned special administration programs. The 95th House index included a vote on President Carter's proposed Institute for Scientific and Technical Cooperation. The purpose of the institute was to coordinate research on development programs. The Senate's vote on this program did not load sufficiently high on any factor to be included in an index. In the 96th Congress the House factor included a vote on the appropriation for President Reagan's Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), a package of aid and trade provisions to friendly Caribbean nations. The Senate's vote on this issue was included within its policy question dimension.

Most of the differences in these indexes were between the two time periods. The major area of divergence concerns the different proportions of development aid and military aid included within the funding measures of the 95th Congress compared to the 96th Congress. This study calculated that the military aid portions of appropriations bills included in the indexes were 35 percent in 1979, 48 percent in 1981, and 55 percent in 1982.² These figures are rough estimates. Ascertaining the actual levels of each type of aid is an extremely complex and subjective operation because many of the aid programs are intended to accomplish both developmental and military objectives.³ The general idea is that by all accounts military aid increased and developmental aid decreased from 1979 to 1982.

Although the differences cited above indicate a relative change, they do not dispel the overall general scope of the funding dimensions. Evidence that the focus of these four indexes is general can be found

²Economic aid included bilateral and multilateral economic aid. Military aid included military assistance, international military education and training, appropriated amounts for Foreign Military Sales credits, the Economic Support Fund, and the peace-keeping and international narcotics control programs.

The 1979 percentage was calculated from that year's House-passed appropriations bill. The figures were found in CQA 1981, p. 350. The 1981 percentage is from the final version of the appropriations bill passed by both houses. The figures were from CQA 1981, p. 350. The 1982 percentage is from the Senate version of the foreign aid amendment to the continuing appropriations bill. The amount approved in the final version was 52 percent. These percentages were calculated from figures in CQA 1982, p. 245.

³Different people cite different figures for the percentages of development and military aid. A Congressional Quarterly study found that during the years 1979 to 1981 the balance shifted no more than seven percent between any given year. The percentage of military aid for 1979 was 46 percent, 1980-- 48 percent, and 1981-- 52 percent. CQA 1981 p. 348. Representative Jack Kemp found 63 percent military and military-related aid in the 1981 appropriations bill. CQA 1981 p. 346. But, according to the present study's method of calculations the figure was 46 percent. CQA 1981 p. 350.

by looking at the amendments to cut spending levels. Proposals to cut aid levels across-the-board appeared in the 95th House and the 96th Senate indexes. Proposals to cut military aid spending levels emerged in both Senate dimensions. Furthermore, the general nature of the funding issue can be seen by comparing the statistics for the 1979 military aid authorization bill with those for that year's economic aid authorization bill. For the years under study, this was the only time there were separate authorization bills. In the Senate the loading for the military aid vote was .701 and for economic aid it was .700. In the House the loadings were .63 and .74 respectively. The correlation coefficients for the two bills, however, were only .57 in the Senate and .58 in the House.

Some elements of both hypothesized issue viewpoints, prodevelopment and traditional, can be found within the four funding factors. One obviously prodevelopment position is the approval of investing public resources in efforts aimed at solving Third World problems. This support for aid, especially economic and multilateral, corresponds to this group's view of an interdependent world. To a lesser extent this dimension includes aspects of the traditionalist perspective. For example, this viewpoint would include approval for the programs aimed at creating stable investment climates, as well as for programs which supported or rewarded American allies in the fight against communism.

The inverse of each side's view is also apparent within this dimension. Especially during the Carter administration the reasons traditionalists would have opposed funding included their dislike for wasteful spending on ineffective development programs and their frustration at not being able to control the economic and political directions of multilateral aid. Prodevelopment disappointment in the funding bills, espe-

cially during the Reagan administration, would have focused on military assistance to authoritarian governments unlikely to pursue progressive development policies.

The fact that the funding indexes include a combination of the two hypothesized viewpoints means that assigning traditional and prodevelopment ends to these continuums would be presumptuous at best. However, this factor deserves attention because it explained more than 36 percent of the variance for three out of four data sets. This importance corresponds to previous studies' findings that spending questions constitute an important dimension of congressional opinion on foreign aid. In the context of the present study, the relationship between funding and other policy decisions becomes more clear. The prominence of funding issues may more than likely be evidence of the compromises between traditionalists and prodevelopment forces that have been necessary in order to pass any overall funding measures. In light of the six indexes remaining to be discussed, the funding factors will be considered as indicators of general foreign aid program approval or disapproval. The remaining indexes will be viewed as delineating the underlying issue dimensions that are included within the funding factors.

Policy Questions

The second group of indexes are those constructed from the general and recipient factors.⁴ For all four data sets the research enabled the formation of one general index encompassing the divisions of opinion on major foreign aid policies. In addition, the 95th House and Senate were both assigned a recipient index which centers around more specific

⁴See table 4 for a synopsis of the issues included on each index. For a description of each vote, see table 1.

TABLE 4

SYNOPSIS OF POLICY DIMENSION ISSUES

95th House General Dimension

Only economic aid (7).
 Anti-communist restrictions (6).
 Multilateral institutions (5).
 Only military aid (2).
 Aid to Panama (2).
 Aid to Nicaragua (2).
 Cuts in bilateral aid spending levels (2).

95th House Recipient Dimension

Aid to specific Central American
 nations (5).
 Require loans to the private sector (1).
 Aid to Zimbabwe-Rhodesia (1).
 Funds to the African Development Fund (1).

95th Senate General Dimension

Multilateral institutions (6).
 Only economic aid (5).
 Ban aid to specific communist nations (4).

95th Senate Recipient Dimension

Economic and/or military aid to different
 combinations of right-wing, moderate, or
 left-wing Central American nations (5).

96th House General Dimension

Military aid programs (2).
 Caribbean Basin initiative (2).
 Require 50% of AID funds to be
 used for projects to help the
 poverty-stricken.

96th Senate General Dimension

Mostly military aid to right-wing
 governments and guerrilla
 groups (6).
 Only military aid (5).
 Nuclear proliferation restrictions
 (2).
 Caribbean Basin Initiative (1).
 Human rights in El Salvador (1).
 Food aid to Poland (1).
 Compensation for damages to U.S.
 Embassies (1).
 Only economic aid (1).

¹The number in parentheses is the number of votes on the subject included in the index. The vote subtotals do not equal the total votes in each index because many votes were combinations of the issues outlined here. For a more complete vote by vote description, see table 1.

policies towards certain Third World regions. The six policy question indexes appear to include enough of the hypothesized foreign aid positions to comfortably label the positive ends of each continuum prodevelopment and the negative ends traditionalist. This placement means that the coding for the 96th Congress is the reverse of the original coding scheme. The positive and negative placements for the two types of congressmen are not intended to imply more favorable attitudes towards a particular foreign aid policy by either the researcher or by the congressmen.

95th House: General Index

The first factor in the 95th House centers around attempts to hold the line against restrictions to aid programs. The major focus of the restrictions is communism. Four of the bills deal with bans on aid to communist or left-leaning governments. A fifth vote seeks support for Taiwan, a traditional anti-communist United States ally, while a sixth vote prohibits school aid to leftist Nicaragua if Cubans are present on the school grounds. Four votes are on cuts in spending levels. Two of these concern overall funding levels; another is specifically leveled at the United Nations Development Fund; and the other is aimed at the World Bank. The remaining two votes in this index concern prohibiting economic and military assistance to Panama.

Because the negative side of this dimension highlights anti-communism, restrictions on economic and multilateral aid, and a pro-American attitude, it is probably a fair fit to the traditionalist approach described in the first hypothesis. There is, however, no actual reference to this camp's supposedly favorable attitude towards helping to stabilize investment climates. This is understandable because combating

communism is believed to be necessary before private investments can be encouraged. The votes against aid to Panama can be interpreted as assigning a low priority to Third World nationalism. However, they also are indicative of a continuing negative response to the Panama Canal Treaties. Prodevelopment aspects include support for Third World independence over the narrower communist-versus-capitalist world view as well as their support for public investments in the economy. Within this index there are no clear lines drawn between the different types of aid. For example, there is prodevelopment support for both military and economic aid to Panama, military aid to Nicaragua, as well as support for general economic aid.

95th House: Recipient Index

Bills and amendments in the remaining 95th House factor aimed different types of economic and military aid at right-wing or left-wing governments in Southern Africa or Central America. This is probably closer to the hypothesized dimensions than the first index. Here support for the African Development Fund and military and economic aid to Nicaragua in particular and Central America in general are indicative of the prodevelopment dimension. Support for Central American aid was aimed at battling the Cubans and Soviets in the economic sphere. The new government of Nicaragua was not believed to be perfect, but it was considered to include a broad coalition of forces that had joined together to overthrow the Somoza dictatorship. If the United States was to have any positive influence on how the country was rebuilt, then it was important to cooperate with the new government and provide assistance. Congressmen with more traditionalist attitudes viewed Nicaraguan aid as help for a government already communist. The traditionalist end of this

continuum is also indicated by support for requiring aid to Rhodesia if elections were held. They opposed President Carter's policy of waiting to give this country aid until after the Zimbabwe African National Union and the Zimbabwe African People's Union negotiated a settlement with the white-minority government. Also at the negative end of this index are votes to require support for private sector development in Nicaragua.

95th Senate: General Index

The general policy dimension for the 95th Senate is a condensed version of the first factor in the House. Four of the six votes are Senate rejections of the House bans on bilateral or multilateral aid to communist countries. The two other votes concern increasing appropriations for multilateral institutions over the House-passed amounts. The positive side of this continuum indicates support for no-strings attached contributions to multilateral institutions. Bank supporters, believing that banks would not be able to accept money contributed with strings on it, viewed the restrictions as efforts to gut the banks. This is interpreted as a prodevelopment position because it places more emphasis on international cooperation involving economic problems. The negative end of this continuum indicates a strong anti-communist attitude coupled with the belief that Congress must ensure that taxpayers money not be used to support America's supposed enemies. The bills in this dimension are all from a series of amendments concerning multilateral aid. Because the force behind the restrictions was anti-communism, this scale will often be referred to as an indication of anti-communist sentiments.

95th Senate: Recipient Index

The other Senate factor for the end of Carter's administration is similar to the House recipient index except that the Senate dimension concerns only Central American policies. Three of the five votes pertain to economic or military aid to Nicaragua and Central America. A fourth vote is on allowing the President to provide military aid to Nicaragua if the administration deemed that the Sandinista government was not violating human rights. The fifth vote is an attempt to cut aid to Nicaragua and redistribute most of the funds to the right-wing government of El Salvador.

Even though this dimension concerns only Central American policy, it highlights well the disagreements about who should receive assistance. The positive end of the continuum represents support for strengthening Nicaraguan moderates with both economic and military aid. Not providing aid to these forces was viewed as forcing the country to turn further to the Cubans and Soviets for more help. On the opposite end are those who cannot countenance Marxist participation in any government which receives American aid. As such, Nicaragua was considered to already be a communist controlled country. To support this belief, this camp cited the friendly ties Nicaragua had with Cuba and the fact that Nicaragua did not support the United States on such United Nations votes as the condemnation of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The traditionalist's anti-Sandinista opinion was so strong that it included support for aid to guerrillas trying to overthrow that regime.⁵

⁵CQA 1980, p. 325.

96th House: General Index

For the most part the 96th House policy question dimension put guns and carrots on the negative end of the continuum and butter on the positive end. Decisions suggestive of the traditionalist perspective include support for funding construction of an airfield in Honduras, Military Assistance Grants to strategic, friendly governments and two votes in support of the CBI. This group's positions on the CBI bills meant support for the program's trade provisions and opposition to imposing import quotas on duty-free rum. While it is obvious that the later bill was proposed in order to protect an American product, both bills probably indicate that some of the congressmen on the positive end of this continuum either disagreed with the philosophy of this type of aid or found that domestic concerns outweighed the intended benefits to the Caribbean. An indication of the type of aid more likely to be approved by prodevelopment representatives can be found in the positive loading for the requirement that at least 50 percent of the Agency for International Development (AID) bilateral assistance funds be used to finance projects that benefit those living in absolute poverty.

96th Senate: General Index

The policy question dimension for the 96th Senate appears to be a fairly good representation of the hypothesized issue dimensions. Most of the issues involved have obviously traditionalist positions. The highest loading amendment on this factor was an effort to repeal the ban on military aid to the right-wing dictatorship in Chile. Three other amendments in which right-wing elements in Central America received support dealt with providing covert aid to factions fighting the government of Nicaragua, funding construction of an airfield in Honduras in order to

build up the defenses of that country to withstand communist expansion, and opposing saddling the government of El Salvador with making human rights progress. The negative end of this continuum also includes efforts to provide the President with a contingency fund within the Economic Support Fund (ESF). The ESF is meant to aid economic development in friendly countries so that they can spend more of their own resources on defense. The Reagan administration wanted the contingency fund to help right-wing governments, especially those in Central America. Similar beliefs are evident in votes to repeal the Clark amendment which prohibited aid to anti-communist guerrillas fighting the leftist government of Angola.

Support for President Reagan's economic and military aid spending levels and the CBI also are in line with helping United States friends and, especially the later bill, encouraging private investment. The traditionalistic philosophy behind the CBI is not only evident because the program extended tax breaks to United States corporations investing in the region, but it is also evident in a long list of restrictions designed to protect American sugar and textile products, to prohibit aid to any nation not following the rules of free enterprise, and to exclude any nation not fully compensating Americans for nationalized property. In this instance the traditionalist position on compensation matches the attitude towards this issue within Schneider's description of the conservative belief system. However, the current study found evidence that this group's demands for compensation might be outweighed by other concerns. This side mostly voted against an amendment which would have cut off aid to any country failing to fully compensate Americans for damages incurred in attacks on United States Embassies. The

amendment was proposed to cut off aid to Pakistan because that country was believed to be developing a nuclear weapon. The opposition on this vote, however, were more concerned with strengthening Pakistan's defenses in order to counter Soviet moves in Afghanistan.

The positive side of this continuum is of course the opposition to the above policies. For the most part the rationales have already been discussed. There are, however, three issues which deserve explanation. The first subject concerns support for cutting off aid to Pakistan and India if they explode a nuclear device. This prodevelopment position coincides with Schneider's descriptions of liberals being more concerned with new issues such as nuclear proliferation. Second, this side of the dimension supported cutting the CBI appropriation in half. The CBI did include some programs, such as offering poor countries better trade terms, which prodevelopment Senators might be expected to support. Their seemingly negative attitude is probably due to viewing the CBI as too little⁶ as well as the fact that the largest amount of money was actually targeted at shoring up the right-wing government of El Salvador in its battle against leftist guerrillas.⁷ Third, this side supported Food for Peace provisions to Poland as a means to support the efforts of Solidarity. This could be interpreted as a desire for the United States to support moderate elements within the communist world. But, since it was also a highly partisan issue it could be indicative of general dislike of the administration's conduct of foreign policy.

In summary, the indexes in this study have found support for very

⁶Almost all of the products on this bill's duty-free list already had that status. CQA 1982, p. 152.

⁷CQA 1982, p. 154.

different types of aid, aimed at different types of recipients, and intended to accomplish different types of purposes. They are not nice, neat replications of the hypotheses, but then conclusions without qualifying exceptions are seldom the case in social science research. Satisfaction can be found in the fact that all ten indexes seem to include all aspects of the hypothesized issue positions. More important is the appearance of prodevelopment and traditional viewpoints on the expected ends of the six policy question continuums. What this section has done, therefore, is to provide a foundation to discuss how congressional foreign aid views might be affected by party, constituency and personal characteristics.

Effects of Independent Variables

It was hypothesized that supporters of the two foreign aid dimensions would come from two slightly different groups of congressmen. Traditionalists were thought to more likely be conservatives, non-Northeastern Republicans, members from Mountain states, Southerners, and members from lower income areas. Prodevelopment support was hypothesized to come from liberals, Democrats, Easterners,⁸ high income constituencies and urban areas. In order to ascertain the effects of these two groups of variables, each set of factors were included in separate regression analyses of the ten indexes. A comparison of the accuracy of these two equations can be found in table 5 which shows the R square for each equation on each index. The R square gives the researcher an indication of how much of the variance in the dependent variable is explained by a set of independent variables. For each index

⁸Northeast and Middle Atlantic states.

TABLE 5
COMPARISON OF R^2 FROM THREE EQUATIONS

	Traditional R^2 (F)**	Prodevelopment R^2 (F)**	Non-selective R^2 (F)**
<u>Funding Dimensions</u>			
95th House	.603 (128.917)	.613 (134.509)	.622 (62.720)
95th Senate	.320 (8.742)	.292 (7.662)	.331 (3.910)
96th House	.306 (37.378)	.318 (39.621)	.341 (19.672)
96th Senate	.430 (14.005)	.514 (19.667)	.559 (10.006)
<u>Policy Question Dimensions</u>			
95th House			
General	.756 (262.768)	.767 (279.491)	.772 (128.795)
Recipient	.809 (360.398)	.807 (354.598)	.809 (161.123)
95th Senate			
General	.483 (17.402)	.471 (16.558)	.508 (8.179)
Recipient	.427 (13.869)	.423 (13.661)	.440 (6.209)
96th House			
General	.642 (151.865)	.642 (152.252)	.650 (70.502)
96th Senate			
General	.840 (97.583)	.891 (152.785)	.904 (74.320)

** All F values are significant at the .01 confidence level.

the two sets of variables explain almost the same amount of variance. The only times that the R squares differ by more than .05 are for the two 96th Senate indexes. These slight departures could possibly be due to the fact that these dimensions are the ones on which the pro-development equation's odd variable, metropolitan characteristics, has its most significant effects.

In order to ascertain whether there are any noticeable advantages to choosing specific categories of party and region, each index was analyzed by a third regression equation which included the influences of all categories of these two variables. The regional groups were Northeast, Middle Atlantic, East North Central, West North Central, Mountain, Pacific, Border, and South. The non-selective equation explains either the same amount of variance or slightly more than the hypothesized set of factors (see table 5). Any increase in the accuracy of this third set of variables, however, comes at the expense of a great deal of significance. Although all the F values on the third equation are still significant at the .01 level, they drop to about half the F values produced by the hypotheses' equations.

Within each data set, all three equations are better indicators of positions on the six policy indexes than they are of opinions on the four funding indexes. This is as expected because the funding dimensions are assumed to incorporate the compromises necessary to approve overall foreign aid policy. As general dimensions, the funding indexes should blur the divisions of opinion. Because of this, as well as because this study is mainly focused on analyzing the more specific issue areas, the funding indexes will be discussed briefly and the policy question indexes will receive a more in depth analysis.

Funding Decisions

Because the four funding continuums are assumed not to have pro-development and traditional ends, they will be discussed in terms of who opposed and supported the aid programs. Divisions of opinion were found by running regressions on each index with the two equations containing hypothesized variables. If these equations are representative of foreign aid coalitions, then it is hoped that the analysis in this section might infer which senators and representatives are more or less supportive of overall foreign aid programs.

In order to gain some insight into the relative strength of each variable within each equation, standardized beta coefficients will be compared.⁹ A look at table 6 shows that bivariate betas, except those for party and the South, are always significant at the .05 level and are at least above .11. The real fun begins, however, when controls are introduced with the multiple regressions. (See table 7.)

Ideology appears to have the greatest significant effect on the funding dimensions. Liberals are more favorable while conservatives are more critical. Bivariate betas show that ideological influences are more distinct during the 95th Congress than they are for the 96th. However, when controls are added, the effect of ideology remains the same in the 95th, but it grows considerably for the 96th. Apparently, the dynamics of the later Congress were such that the interrelationships among the variables served to uncover more ideological differences.

⁹Two types of standardized beta coefficients will be used. Bivariate betas indicate the effects a single independent variable such as ideology has on a dependent variable such as a funding index. Partial betas indicate the effects an independent variable has after the effects of the other independent variables have been controlled.

TABLE 6

BIVARIATE BETAS ON FUNDING DIMENSIONS

Variables in Traditionalist Equation

	House		Senate	
	95th	96th	95th	96th
Ideology	.76**	.43**	.51**	.35**
Non-Northeastern Republicans	-.46**	-.08	-.18	.05
Mountain	-.12*	-.11*	-.31**	-.20*
South	-.30**	-.25**	-.18	-.27**
Income	.37**	.34**	.29**	.50**

Variables in Prodevelopment Equation

	House		Senate	
	95th	96th	95th	96th
Ideology	.76**	.43**	.51**	.35**
Democrats	.42**	.05	.17	-.13
East	.31**	.27**	.22*	.38**
Income	.37**	.34**	.29**	.50**
Metro	.40**	.35**	.25*	.38**

* Significant at .05 confidence level.

** Significant at .01 confidence level.

TABLE 7
PARTIAL BETAS ON FUNDING DIMENSIONS

Traditionalist Equation				
	House		Senate	
	95th	96th	95th	96th
Ideology	.66**	.66**	.52**	.59**
Non-Northeastern Republicans	-.06	.36**	.18	.50**
Mountain	-.04	-.06	-.20**	-.15*
South	-.02	-.09*	.02	.05
Income	.18**	.19**	.11	.37**

Prodevelopment Equation				
	House		Senate	
	95th	96th	95th	96th
Ideology	.65**	.57**	.53**	.69**
Democrats	.04	-.33**	-.13	-.66**
East	.10**	.06	.05	.06
Income	.12**	.08	.02	.17**
Metro	.07**	.14**	.11	.20**

*Significant at .05 confidence level.

**Significant at .01 confidence level.

There is not a great deal of difference between ideology's effect on the two House indexes, except that the less-selective prodevelopment equation does assign a somewhat lesser role to ideological influences in the later time period. More information is available from an examination of the two Senate indexes. Ideology is the only consistently significant influence in the 95th Senate. Its effect is larger in the next Senate, but so are the effects from most of the other variables. It appears that in 1981-82 ideological, party, socioeconomic, and urban-rural lines were drawn much more sharply with liberals, Republicans, higher income states and urban areas providing the most support to foreign aid funding.

By themselves party positions are clear only for the 95th House. Democrats supported foreign aid and non-Northeastern Republicans opposed it. However, after controlling the effects of the other variables, the effect of party is seen to be much different. While party positions are not distinguishable for the 95th Congress, the non-Northeastern Republicans become significantly favorable towards aid spending in 1981-1982. This may indicate that the changing focus of aid, away from anti-poverty programs and towards a more militaristic posture, helped pull more than the usual number of Republicans towards support while it drove more than the usual number of Democrats into opposition. The Republican position may also have been due to loyalty to their party's president. This greater partisan split during a Republican administration does not coincide with Turner's and Clausen's finding that Republican presidents receive more bipartisan support for foreign policy. However, it is probably safe to suggest that the previous Republican administrations of Eisenhower, Nixon, and Ford did not change the

scope of policy as much as Reagan.

None of the above discussion of party influences is meant to imply that President Carter enjoyed bipartisan support for his foreign aid policies. In fact, during 1979 to 1980 his administration was unable to secure final passage of a separate appropriations bill.

The regional variables, Mountain and Southern in the traditional equation and Eastern in the prodevelopment equation, provide only a few minor instances of significant effects that lend themselves to interpretations. Mountain senators were more opposed to aid than were the region's representatives. This finding may be clouded by the fact that the percentage of senators from Mountain states is much higher than the proportion of House members from the region. Analyses without controls show Mountain representatives very slightly in the opposition camp. Southerners normally were not strongly either way on funding bills. They were somewhat supportive in the 96th House when funding bills were more traditionalistic. This position did not carry over significantly to their counterparts in the Senate.

Bivariate betas show Easterners significantly supportive of funding foreign aid. However, three times out of four this importance disappears when controls are added. It may be reasoned that ideology, income level and urban characteristics serve to explain most Eastern support.

Second to ideology, appears to be constituency income levels with members from higher income areas supportive and those from lower income areas opposed. All bivariate betas infer a significant influence for this variable. In fact, among all bivariate betas on funding and policy question scales, the only time that the ideology ones are not the

largest comes in the 96th Senate funding dimension in which income is the largest. Some of this influence, however, is subsequently explained by the other variables. This effect of income remains strongest in the 95th House and for the 96th Senate. In the 96th House it is significant with the traditional equation, but not with the prodevelopment set of variables. This is probably partly due to the inclusion of metropolitan characteristics in the later equation.

Urban senators and representatives are somewhat more supportive of foreign aid funding than are their colleagues from rural areas. The significance of this influence survives controls on both indexes in the House and on the 96th Senate index, but the partial betas are of a rather low magnitude. Metropolitan characteristics are strongest when party is also strong. This indicates that party differences that cannot be explained as ideological or due to income levels are related to whether or not members represent urban or rural states.

In order to test whether or not the selective party and region variables offer valid descriptions of regional and partisan influences, multiple regressions including all categories of these variables were done on each funding index (see table 8). The only finding worthy of mention concerns the 96th Senate. This is the dimension on which income and metropolitan variables make their highest marks. However, caution is in order because the results in table 8 suggest that more inclusive regional and party categories tend to dilute the strength of income and metropolitan effects.

In summary, the differences in the policies included within the 95th Congress funding measures as opposed to those of the 96th Congress appear to have been great enough to change the make-up of coalitions

TABLE 8

RESULTS OF NON-SELECTIVE REGRESSIONS ON THE
96TH SENATE FUNDING DIMENSION

	Partial Beta	R ² Change	r ²	Bivariate Beta
Ideology	.69**	.12	.12	.35**
Party	-.69**	.16	.02	-.13
Region	a	.05	.34	a
Income	.14	.01	.25	.50**
Metro	.17**	.02	.15	.38**
Multiple R	.747			
R ²	.559			
F	10.006**			

** Significant at the .01 confidence level.

^a Multiple regression does not offer a partial beta for dichotomous variables with more than two categories.

supporting and opposing overall aid spending levels. The most obvious movement towards a realignment was the increase in Republican support and Democratic opposition to funding foreign aid when the scope of the programs shifted towards a more traditionalist approach. The following discussion of the influences affecting issues, which are more specifically policy-related, offers a better indication of who supports what.

Policy Question Indexes

An examination of the standardized beta coefficients for the six policy question indexes shows that in every analysis one variable, ide-

ology, had by far the strongest effect on congressional voting. (See tables 9 and 10.) On four indexes the party variables, non-Northeastern Republicans in the traditional equation and Democrats in the pro-development equation, are a distant second in strength. The region variables, Mountain and Southern in traditional and Eastern in prodevelopment, were similar in that they produced very few significant effects. Both equations assigned small, but significant, betas to income level influences for two indexes. Urban-rural differences did not add much to the explanation of voting positions when it was included on the prodevelopment regressions. Only once, when the Senate divided over anti-communist attitudes, did metropolitan characteristics become important.

There was some diversity in the results attributable to the different variables included in the two equations. However, most of the identifiable differences, appeared between the House and the Senate or among the indexes. In order to clarify the relative importance of each variable, the ensuing discussion will focus on each independent variable as it affects the positions on the policy indexes.

Ideology

The most glaring result of the regression analyses is that ideology consistently exhibits the greatest effect on congressional foreign aid voting. The ideology betas are the only ones which are significant at the .01 level on every index. The positive betas for ideology indicate that liberals are more likely at the prodevelopment ends of the continuums while the conservatives are more likely at the traditionalist ends.

Eleven times out of twelve, ideology is stronger in the House than in the Senate. The only exception occurs when the traditionalist equation assigns an extraordinarily high partial beta to ideology in the 96th

TABLE 9

BIVARIATE BETAS ON POLICY QUESTION DIMENSIONS

Variables in Traditionalist Equation						
	95th House		96th House	95th Senate		96th Senate
	Recipient	General	General	Recipient	General	General
Ideology	.86**	.87**	.77**	.65**	.59**	.88**
Non-northeastern Republicans	-.74**	-.53**	-.66**	-.40**	-.12	-.79**
Mountain	-.10*	-.08	-.03	-.23*	-.24*	-.14
South	-.16**	-.26**	-.22**	-.24*	-.36**	-.17
Income	.14**	.26**	.02	.27**	.47**	.13
Variables in Prodevelopment Equation						
	95th House		96th House	95th Senate		96th Senate
	Recipient	General	General	Recipient	General	General
Ideology	.86**	.87**	.77**	.65**	.59**	.88**
Democrats	.73**	.53**	.64**	.35**	.17	.87**
East	.16**	.12*	.13**	.18	.18	.19
Income	.14**	.26**	.02	.27**	.47**	.13
Metro	.30**	.35**	.16**	.20*	.40**	.24*

* Significant at .05 confidence level.

** Significant at .01 confidence level.

TABLE 10

PARTIAL BETAS ON POLICY QUESTION DIMENSIONS

Traditionalist Equation						
	95th House		96th House	95th Senate		96th Senate
	Recipient	General	General	Recipient	General	General
Ideology	.67**	.89**	.63**	.57**	.60**	.71**
Non-northeastern Republicans	-.32**	.02	-.22**	-.05	.26**	-.30**
Mountain	-.00	.02	.04	-.06	-.14*	.08**
South	.04	.05*	-.06*	-.06	-.04	.01
Income	.00	.03	-.10**	.03	.23**	-.07

Prodevelopment Equation						
	95th House		96th House	95th Senate		96th Senate
	Recipient	General	General	Recipient	General	General
Ideology	.67**	.88**	.70**	.64**	.60**	.56**
Democrats	.32**	.00	.18**	-.01	-.19**	.47**
East	-.01	-.12**	-.05*	.00	-.08	-.02
Income	-.03	.02	-.07*	.02	.18**	-.00
Metro	.03	.03	-.04	.03	.19**	-.00

* Significant at .05 confidence level.

** Significant at .01 confidence level.

Senate. The traditionalist regression shows a .71 partial beta while the prodevelopment one produces a .56 partial beta. This is one of the largest differences between the partial betas for comparable variables. An analysis of the influences of the other factors in both equations on this index shows that the Democrats are a stronger control variable than are the non-Northeastern Republicans. It should be noted that the Democrat variable measures the strength of both parties. As such it could mean that the overall effect of party on this dimension is diluted by the inclusion of the more selective, non-Northeastern Republican variable on the traditionalist equations. Therefore, the results probably make it safe to say that on all indexes, ideology is more of a factor in the House than in the Senate.

The strongest presence of ideology is on the general index in the 95th House. At first glance there is no ready explanation why this index produces an ideology partial beta so exceptionally large. Another look at the House dimensions, shows that this one includes the broadest range of bills. However, on the 96th Senate dimension, which is the broadest Senate index, ideology is not noticeably higher than on any other Senate index. One explanation for this discrepancy between ideology's affect on these two broad indexes may be that ideological differences are stronger in the House. An alternative explanation is based on analysis of the indexes on which the ideology bivariate betas are in the .86 to .88 range. Of these indexes the 95th House general index shows by far the lowest influence from the uncontrolled party variables. Furthermore, this index's counterpart, the general 95th Senate index, also shows insignificant party influence when other variables are not controlled. The party variables only become important after controls

are added. They do not, however, detract from the importance of ideology. Therefore, it may be that under the Carter administration, ideology played a greater role in development opinions because party influences were fuzzier.

Party

All twelve bivariate regressions show non-Northeastern Republicans to be more traditionalist and Democrats more prodevelopmental. The major finding, however, concerning the effects of the two party variables is that they tend to be factors which become important if ideology is showing less than its usual dominance. In three of the four multiple regressions producing significant party influence, the members follow expected patterns. Several enlightening exceptions will be discussed within the context of comparing House and Senate counterpart indexes and comparing the 95th Congress with the 96th.

Analyzing the general indexes in the 95th Congress shows that party produced different results in the House than in the Senate. In the House party is significant by itself, but with multivariate regressions its importance is subsequently explained as ideological differences. In many respects the situation surrounding the 95th Senate is general index is different. This dimension is the only time the party variables are not significant by themselves. When the other variables are controlled, party influences remain significant, but alas party positions are reversed. The most likely interpretation of this deviation is that while the House scale is one of the broadest definitions of traditional versus prodevelopment positions, the Senate index may actually be a more clear measure of anti-communist sentiment. This sentiment is probably somewhat distinct from the other aspects of the prodevelopment and traditionalist

dimensions. As such when it comes to communism, the difference between the parties is not as significant as ideology, income or urban-rural constituencies. Conservatives and senators from lower income or rural states tend to take a more active anti-communist stance.

There are also differences between the results for the 95th Congress indexes surrounding the ideological make-up of aid recipients. The partisan split is greater on this House dimension than it is on any other House dimension. Democrats supported American aid to more progressive countries while non-Northeastern Republicans supported aid to elements more likely to maintain the status quo. That this is the most partisan dimension is not surprising. The policies incorporated into this dimension concern President Carter's positions towards Central America and Southern Africa. The partisan nature of this index may indicate the pull of presidential loyalty as well as party position.

The Senate's counterpart index concerning recipient's ideology is related to the right and left only in Central America. It indicates that alternative forces were present during this body's consideration of Carter's policies. While party members follow their expected positions when party influences are analyzed separately, party positions become insignificant when controls are added. Because this dimension has the lowest R square of any of the policy question dimensions (see table 5), it might indicate that, more than for any other index, the divisions of opinion are due to independent variables other than the ones included here. In fact, the only variable in this study which is significant on this dimension is ideology.

A comparison of party influence on the general indexes in the 95th Congress to the indexes in the 96th Congress shows that party solidar-

TABLE 11

PERCENTAGE OF PARTY SUPPORT FOR PRODEVELOPMENT,
MODERATE, AND TRADITIONAL POSITIONS
95TH AND 96TH SENATE GENERAL DIMENSIONS

	Democrats		Republicans	
	95th % (#)	96th % (#)	95th % (#)	96th % (#)
Prodevelopment (1.00 to 0.34)	55 (33)	70 (33)	41 (17)	0 (0)
Moderate (0.33 to -0.33)	8 (5)	26 (12)	5 (2)	13 (7)
Traditional (-0.34 to -1.00)	<u>37 (22)</u>	<u>4 (2)</u>	<u>54 (22)</u>	<u>87 (47)</u>
Totals	100 (60)	100 (47)	100 (41)	100 (54)

ity might have been greater during the later Congress. In the House the increase in party effects may be attributable to a decrease in ideological differences. It may also be an indication that the 32 additional Republicans in the 96th House helped make party divisions more pronounced.

In the Senate there is no noticeable difference in the effect of ideology, whereas party appears to have made a gigantic jump in importance. In 1981 and 1982 the Republicans were the Senate majority. Also during this time President Reagan was asking Congress to approve changes in the direction of foreign aid. A look at table 11 shows that the percentage of prodevelopment Republicans dropped from 41 percent in the 95th Senate to none in the 96th, while traditional Democrats decreased from 37 percent to 4 percent. Much of this polarization shows that the parties had obviously different reactions to the President's proposed policy changes in foreign aid.

Region

Contrary to the findings of most previous research, the results of this study's regression analysis find region to be either slightly important or not significant. Much of this seemingly unimportant status for region might be explained as attributable to the inclusion of an ideology variable and left at that. However, the equation only included selective categories, Mountain and Southern in the traditional equation and Eastern in the prodevelopment. Because the use of selective categorical variables in multiple regressions may not be the best method of ascertaining their overall effects, it is felt that a more in depth analysis of region is in order.

An analysis of variance performed on the policy question dimensions shows Southern, Mountain, and West North Central states to be consistently more traditional than their colleagues in both the House and Senate (see table 12). In the House, Northeastern and Pacific representatives provides the most consistent prodevelopment support. Meanwhile, prodevelopment sentiment in the Senate usually came from the Middle Atlantic, East North Central and Northeast regions. Pacific coast senators changed from a prodevelopment position in the 95th Congress to a traditionalist view in the 96th. This reversal can partially be explained by the election in 1980 of more Republicans from this region.

When adjustments are made for party, several large gaps between party position within regions are uncovered in the House. The strongest intra-region disagreement appears to be between Republicans and Democrats from the Upper Midwest. Much of this is due to West North Central Democrats being some of the most consistently strong prodevelopment supporters. Within the Mountain and Border regions, party

TABLE 12

REGIONAL DEVIATIONS FROM THE GRAND MEAN FOR POLICY DIMENSIONS

	House					
	95th Recipient **	95th General **	96th General **	95th Recipient **	95th General **	96th General **
Northeast	.28	.45	.45	.36	.21	.39
Middle Atlantic	.12	.15	.06	.16	.13	.09
East North Central	.15	-.01	.03	.10	.23	.09
West North Central	-.13	-.08	-.03	.20	.08	.15
Mountain	-.27	-.36	-.11	-.17	-.13	.06
Pacific	.34	.15	.12	.12	.32	.11
Border	-.12	-.00	.12	-.14	-.22	.01
South	-.35	-.22	-.27	-.33	-.43	-.36
Grand Mean	.12	-.26	-.17			

	Adjusted Deviations			Deviation Adjusted for Party		
	95th Recipient **	95th General **	96th General **	95th Recipient **	95th General *	96th General **
Northeast	.35	.20	.29	.34	.20	.24
Middle Atlantic	.15	.40	.26	.20	.42	.29
East North Central	.41	.56	.26	.30	.51	.09
West North Central	-.03	-.22	-.25	.07	-.18	.02
Mountain	-.39	-.46	-.24	-.27	-.40	-.05
Pacific	.39	.66	-.11	.39	.66	-.03
Border	.00	.31	.37	-.03	.29	.12
South	-.36	-.59	-.25	-.44	-.63	-.36
Grand Mean	.13	.04	-.17			

* Significant .02 confidence level.

** Significant .01 confidence level.

account for the gap.

In the Senate, adjustments for party produces different results. There is no consistently large change in regional deviations from the grand mean. Curiously though, during the 95th Senate, several regional groups of Republicans are more prodevelopment than are their Democratic colleagues. For 1979 to 1980 East North Central and Border Democrats are more traditional than Republicans. On the general index, Senate Democrats from the East North Central, West North Central, Border and Pacific states seem to have taken stands slightly the reverse of their hypothesized positions. Again this index measures anti-communist sentiment and thus these results are confirmation of the theory that anti-communist attitudes are not clearly based on party.

Income

When considered by itself income turns out to be a significant factor on all four indexes in the 95th Congress, but it is not significant in either index in the 96th Congress. When significant, higher income levels tend to imply prodevelopment positions. When controls are employed, however, the importance of income disappears three times out of four. This may mean that the influence of income is usually explainable in terms of the other variables. The only time income remains significant is on the 95th Senate index concerning anti-communist attitudes.

The odd finding concerning income appears on the 96th House index on which this variable is significant only after the other influences are controlled. This time low income districts tend to produce prodevelopment positions. However, a check on the R square change for this index shows that including income in the equations explains less than one percent more variance. Therefore, not much will be made of this appar-

ment positions. However, a check on the R square change for this index shows that including income in the equations explains less than one percent more variance. Therefore, not much will be made of this apparent discrepancy except to say that income is probably not a very good indicator of opinions on foreign aid policy questions.

Metro

The only time metropolitan characteristics produced a significant partial beta is on the 95th Senate's general index. Again, since this index also overtly measures anti-communist attitudes, it may be that senators from more rural states are more likely to favor restrictions on aid if it might go to communist countries. Considered alone this factor does produce betas significantly tilted toward urban support for the prodevelopment position. This tendency is more pronounced in the House than in the Senate. This would seem natural because congressional districts are more homogeneous than are states.

Comparing the results for funding indexes to policy question indexes proves to be mostly an exercise riddled with confusing exceptions. Thus, most interpretations would be weak at best. There are, of course, three exceptions where generalizations may be made. The first is that liberals support spending and a prodevelopment perspective, and conservatives are more reluctant to fund programs and they are more traditionalist. The second generalization concerns the effects of constituents' income levels and the percentage of urban residents. Higher income and more urban areas tend to be indicators of funding support while they are not important criteria for differentiating policy positions. The second tentative finding concerns the clarification of party positions in the 96th Congress. The stronger party effects found for the funding

indexes correspond to a wider partisan split on the policy question scales. A more in depth analysis of conclusions will be undertaken in the next chapter.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

The first hypothesis was that this research would find two foreign aid issue dimensions, one incorporating traditionalist views and the other prodevelopment beliefs. Instead, the factor analysis produced dimensions for funding, general policy and specific policy. Each factor included aspects of prodevelopment and traditionalist perspectives. Semantics aside, it may have been too much to hope that factor analyses of four data sets would produce for each set only two dimensions, one traditional and the other prodevelopment, or even one single dimension with prodevelopment and traditional ends. Nevertheless, the results are actually fairly remarkable in their consistency across data sets. Funding and general policy indexes appeared for each group. Both chambers of the 95th Congress had a third factor centered around who should receive United States aid, the issue hypothesized to be the major point of disagreement between the two sides. Furthermore, there were no major differences between the focus of issues considered by the House and Senate. The hypothesized issue viewpoints were easily assigned to the poles of all six policy dimensions, thus providing the foundation to test the remaining hypotheses concerning who is traditional and who prodevelopment.

The appearance of funding dimensions does not imply rejection of a policy oriented view of foreign aid issues. These dimensions offer a

base to study support and opposition to overall policy. The policy question factors serve as indicators of the broad range of foreign aid issues. In this study two of the general indexes, the 95th House and the 96th Senate, were close to the hoped for general measurements. Both of these factors explained a majority of the variance. A third general index, the 96th House policy dimension, was an important second of two factors. Only for the 95th Senate did the general index factor explain a relatively small portion of the variance. While any conclusions about a two-sided division over foreign aid is still rather speculative, the symmetry among the measures used here for issue dimensions have substantially reduced the complexity of the foreign aid issues.

The perspectives of United States foreign aid have been divided into two simplified positions. For the most part they correspond well to the findings of Schneider and to the liberal-conservative definitions offered by McCormick and Black. On one side of the policy dimensions this study found all of the hypothesized traditionalist rationales about aid policies. Seeing the world through Cold War lenses, this group is mostly concerned with fostering private enterprise and using force to protect the status quo and American interests. Foreign aid is useful if it enables the United States to make a strong response to the spread of communism. During the 95th Congress they were more or less in the position of restricting the growth of economic aid programs believed to be wasteful and aimed at impossible goals. The relevance they attached to military aid as opposed to economic aid is more clear for the 96th Congress than for the 95th. For 1981-1982 they supported limited trade and investment incentives as proper economic aid. This is more in line with classical economic views that any government involvement in the

economy should be limited. Whatever development that occurs will happen through private initiatives and concerns about equity and social change are better left alone. The substantial support that this group gave to military aid may be an indication of the willingness to use force to create conditions where private enterprise might be safe.

This analysis also substantiated the hypothesis that the prodevelopment position centered around a broader view of world issues. This group is apparently more likely to place greater emphasis on international cooperation and is less likely to interpret the Third World's nationalistic activities as direct threats to American interests. As far as the development-military aid dichotomy is concerned the results show a mixture nearly opposite the traditionalist position. In the 95th Congress prodevelopment forces supported a larger role for economic assistance. Meanwhile, they did not oppose military aid especially if it was targeted at moderate or left-leaning governments. In the 96th Congress this side maintained their support for development programs but opposed the increases and intended uses of military aid desired by the traditionalist Reagan administration. This may mean that while prodevelopment congressmen accept the importance of military concerns they qualify their support according to their opinion of the uses and targets of military aid. On the whole, they believe that more attention needs to be on the problems that make countries susceptible to communist advances. The problems are to be addressed by spending public funds on anti-poverty programs.

It appears that when congressmen are faced with choosing the desired focus of foreign aid, they most often make decisions based on their preconceived notions about the ideological leanings of the intended

recipient governments. Traditionalists support governments more to the right side of the political spectrum while prodevelopment congressmen support those more to the left. This does not imply that the American legislators approve all the policies of their favored countries. It does indicate what type of countries each group trusts to more likely carry out their foreign aid philosophies.

The second and third hypotheses concerned the coalitions of support for the two foreign aid concepts. Substantiation of these expectations becomes rather complex because the results of the factor analyses produced several types of dimensions. Not much information is forthcoming from a comparison of the effects on the funding and policy question indexes. The only finding is that liberals were more likely supportive of funding and the prodevelopment positions while conservatives more often opposed funding and supported the traditionalist position. On funding indexes party positions were not conclusive for the 95th Congress, but in the 96th Congress Republicans were more supportive and Democrats more opposed. This indicates that party positions probably depend on the general focus of the aid programs as well as the party in the White House. Unlike previous studies, this one found greater partisan differences under a Republican President. This indicates the hazards that changing political circumstances mean for making any longitudinal conclusions. The results concerning region, income and urban-rural factors do not permit conclusions. The lack of regional influences on funding questions differs from most other studies, but the unimportance of all three demographic characteristics confirms Demack's conclusions.

Probably the major finding of this project was that ideology has a

very significant effect on the policy positions of congressmen. This is evidence that the set of beliefs members of Congress bring with them are important influences on the decision-making process. The ideology variable was intended to measure attitudes on both domestic and foreign policy views. Its apparent importance may help confirm the idea that Congress looks at foreign aid from the same set of beliefs as they do domestic issues. Speculating on this conclusion a bit further, the supposedly different nature of the foreign aid issue due to its lack of domestic clientele does not seem to mean that congressmen make decisions about it from a different set of beliefs.

Other effects on policy issues did not offer consistent substantiation of the hypotheses. Party positions were as expected only half the time. Non-Northeastern Republicans were more likely traditional and Democrats more prodevelopment. Their significance was much less when ideology rose in importance. Overall ideology was a much better indicator of opinion. This finding adds some weight to the idea that parties are decreasing in influence. Party cohesion is, however, affected by the inducement of presidential loyalty. Democrats supported President Carter's specific policies but the support for his plans was somewhat different than for the more general issues during his administration. On the other side, Republicans responded favorably to President Reagan's policy positions.

As far as regional differences are concerned, the results are cause for speculation, but not conclusion. It appears that Mountain and Southern members, along with their colleagues from the West North Central states, tended to be traditional. While Northeasterners were always more likely prodevelopment, other support for this view more

often than not came from Middle Atlantic, East North Central and Pacific regions. Income and urban-rural variables usually offered insignificant or inconclusive effects. However, it appears that there is an interaction among all the hypothesized influences that this study is not designed to uncover. Especially the effects of region appear to be explainable by a combination of ideological, partisan, income and metropolitan characteristics. Further research using path analysis may be able to shed more light on the dynamics of foreign aid policy-making. Another suggestion for future research would be a more longitudinal analysis in order to improve the chances of identifying changes in policy dimensions as well as providing a better base to ascertain the effects of differing political influences. Other research may also be able to offer simpler equations to ascertain how divisions over foreign aid are influenced by other political forces. In the present study, the use of two similar equations to measure the effects of influences on congressional opinions was necessary to maintain the consistency of the research effort. However, it added more to the complexity of the project than it aided the findings.

As the world becomes more interdependent American isolationist tendencies become less possible. Congressional positions towards foreign aid show that there are identifiable opinions on how the United States ought to involve itself in foreign affairs. These attitudes are based upon different world-views leading senators and representatives to make different conclusions about what problem-solving techniques the United States should use to protect its interests. What choices are made have important ramifications for the course of world events. How these decisions are made has become important not only to Americans but also

to the rest of the world.

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